Promoting cooperation by setting a ceiling payoff for defectors under three-strategy public good games

Jianlei Zhang, Yuying Zhu, Qiaoyu Li and Zengqiang Chen

International Journal of Systems Science, 2018, vol. 49, issue 10, 2267-2286

Abstract: The puzzle of altruistic behaviours among multi-agent systems poses a dilemma, which has been an overlapping topic that covers many subjects. The public goods game can be regarded as a paradigm for modelling and exploring it. In the traditional definition of public goods game, the equally divided benefit among all participants leads to the dominance of defection. Much effort has been made to explain the evolution of cooperation, including the model in which the payoff ceilings for defectors are introduced. Further, we study a three-strategy evolutionary public goods game by providing the role of being loners. The payoff ceilings will take effect when the number of cooperators exceeds some threshold. Analysis results by following the replicator dynamics indicate that lower values of the payoff ceilings can better promote levels of public cooperation. Importantly, a remarkable cyclic route has been found: when receiving relative lower benefits, loners act as catalysts, helping the population to escape from mutual defection to cooperation. And, the stable equilibrium points from cooperation to isolation can be realised by improving the fixed payoffs of loners. Finally, broader ceilings also for cooperators provide us more hints about how to suppress the spreading of defectors under certain conditions.

Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1080/00207721.2018.1498554

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