EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Opaque pricing over vertically differentiated servers

Xin Geng

IISE Transactions, 2018, vol. 50, issue 7, 627-642

Abstract: We study a pricing problem for a service firm facing delay-sensitive customers. Servers are quality-differentiated, where the quality can be improved based on the servers’ past experience. In such cases, the commonly used pricing scheme fails to effectively facilitate the quality improvement for servers and therefore impedes the firm’s future revenue increase. Motivated by the probabilistic selling strategy, we propose another pricing scheme where the firm does not disclose the server assignment to the customers until payment is made. With respect to the long-run total revenue, we compare the two schemes and establish the superiority of the one that we propose. Moreover, we investigate how the revenue advantage from the proposed pricing scheme is affected by the quality improvement process and the degree of vertical differentiation, both of which are important features in the setting. Finally, we discuss the generalized model with heterogeneous arrival classes.

Date: 2018
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/24725854.2018.1434332 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:uiiexx:v:50:y:2018:i:7:p:627-642

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/uiie20

DOI: 10.1080/24725854.2018.1434332

Access Statistics for this article

IISE Transactions is currently edited by Jianjun Shi

More articles in IISE Transactions from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-20
Handle: RePEc:taf:uiiexx:v:50:y:2018:i:7:p:627-642