EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Design and incentive decisions to increase cooperation in humanitarian relief networks

Reut Noham and Michal Tzur

IISE Transactions, 2020, vol. 52, issue 12, 1297-1311

Abstract: During humanitarian relief operations, designated facilities are established to assist the affected population and distribute relief goods. In settings where the authorities manage the operations, they instruct the population regarding which facility they should visit. However, in times of crises and uncertainty, these instructions are often not followed. In this work, we investigate how the authorities should invest in incentivizing the population to follow their instructions. These decisions need to be combined with those concerning the relief network design. The population’s behavior and level of cooperation are key factors in deciding on the incentive investments.We present a new mathematical model that incorporates decisions regarding which populations to incentivize to follow the local authorities’ instructions. Then, we develop properties that can help the authorities decide on the level of investment in incentives. A numerical study demonstrates that incentives can improve the system’s performance and enable an equitable supply allocation. Furthermore, an investment in a small number of communities is typically sufficient to significantly improve the system’s performance. We also demonstrate that incentives affect relief-network design decisions.

Date: 2020
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/24725854.2020.1727070 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:uiiexx:v:52:y:2020:i:12:p:1297-1311

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/uiie20

DOI: 10.1080/24725854.2020.1727070

Access Statistics for this article

IISE Transactions is currently edited by Jianjun Shi

More articles in IISE Transactions from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-20
Handle: RePEc:taf:uiiexx:v:52:y:2020:i:12:p:1297-1311