Uniform-price auctions in staffing for self-scheduling service

Yanling Chang, Lu Sun, Matthew F. Keblis and Jie Yang

IISE Transactions, 2020, vol. 53, issue 6, 719-734

Abstract: This research examines a uniform-price auction mechanism in managing staffing for self-scheduling business such as task sourcing and work-from-home call centers. We consider two types of service providers: Type-1 agents who require advanced notice before a shift starts and Type-2 agents who are flexible enough to be scheduled on-demand. We develop an integrated framework that can jointly analyze demand forecast, short-term scheduling, and long-term planning of staff capacity. We discuss the adoption of a blended workforce in scheduling and the implication of attrition costs in the long-term staffing. In addition, we compare the auction model with a popular fixed-wage model, in order to examine under what conditions the auction model is preferred. These results provide insights to staff managers on the choice of staffing and wage models.

Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1080/24725854.2020.1841345

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