Strategic advertising policy in international oligopoly markets
Elizabeth Schroeder () and
Victor J. Tremblay
The International Trade Journal, 2016, vol. 30, issue 1, 3-13
Strategic trade policy has become an important tool used by countries to increase domestic welfare. Ma and Ulph (2012) further this discussion by analyzing strategic advertising policy in international oligopoly markets. They find that it is always optimal for a home government to subsidize advertising for exports, whether firms compete in a Cournot- or Bertrand-type game. By extending their analysis to include the Cournot-Bertrand model, we find that an advertising subsidy is not always optimal for the home country. In some cases, the optimal strategic policy is an advertising tax.
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:uitjxx:v:30:y:2016:i:1:p:3-13
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this article
The International Trade Journal is currently edited by George R. G. Clarke
More articles in The International Trade Journal from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().