The creation of relational rents in venture capitalist-entrepreneur dyads

Dirk De Clercq and Harry J. Sapienza

Venture Capital, 2001, vol. 3, issue 2, 107-127

Abstract: This paper focuses on the question of how relational rents can be created in the venture capitalist-entrepreneur dyad. It identifies how theoretical frameworks, such as agency theory and procedural justice theory, have been used to describe the relationship between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs. Further, it shows how other research streams, such as organizational learning theory and social exchange theory, may be integrated with research on venture capital financing. The central thesis of the paper is that relational rents can be created in venture capitalist-entrepreneur dyads through relation-specific investments and knowledgesharing routines, based on an effective governance of the relationship between both parties.

Date: 2001
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DOI: 10.1080/13691060110045661

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