Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism

Tadashi Hashimoto, Daisuke Hirata, Onur Kesten (), Morimitsu Kurino () and Utku Unver
Additional contact information
Onur Kesten: University of Sydney
Morimitsu Kurino: Keio University

Theoretical Economics, 2014, vol. 9, issue 1

Abstract: This paper studies the problem of assigning a set of indivisible objects to a set of agents when monetary transfers are not allowed and agents reveal only ordinal preferences, but random assignments are possible. We offer two characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism, which assigns lotteries over objects. We show that it is the only mechanism satisfying non-wastefulness and ordinal fairness and the only mechanism satisfying sd-efficiency, sd-envy-freeness, and weak invariance or weak truncation robustness (where "sd" stands for first-order stochastic dominance).

Keywords: Random assignment; probabilistic serial; ordinal fairness; sd-efficiency; sd-envy-freeness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D71 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-02-05
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (56)

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