Theoretical Economics

2006 - Forthcoming

Current editor(s): Simon Board, Todd D. Sarver, Bruno Strulovici, Rakesh Vohra, Pierre-Olivier Weill

From Econometric Society
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Forthcoming

Persistence in a dynamic moral hazard game

J. Aislinn Bohren

Optimal contests with incomplete information and convex effort costs

Mengxi Zhang

On competition for spatially distributed resources in networks

Giorgio Fabbri, Silvia Faggian and Giuseppe Freni

Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good

Laura Doval and Vasiliki Skreta

Worst-case equilibria in first-price auctions

Vitali Gretschko and Helene Mass

Wages as signals of worker mobility

Yu Chen, Matthew Doyle and Francisco Gonzalez

A dynamic model of censorship

Yiman Sun

Buying voters with uncertain instrumental preferences

Charles Louis-Sidois and Leon Andreas Musolff

Optimal sample sizes and statistical decision rules

Sanket Patil and Yuval Salant

Regret-free truth-telling in school choice with consent

Yiqiu Chen and Markus Möller

Direct implementation with evidence

Soumen Banerjee, Yi-Chun Chen and Yifei Sun

Contracting over persistent information

Wei Zhao, Claudio Mezzetti, Ludovic Renou and Tristan Tomala

Asset bubbles and product market competition

Francisco Queiros

Exploiting social influence in networks

Vladyslav Nora and Eyal Winter

Digital currency and privacy

Kee-Youn Kang

Asymmetric all-pay auctions with spillovers

Maria Betto and Matthew Thomas

Optimal delegation and information transmission under limited awareness

Sarah Auster and Nicola Pavoni

Existence and uniqueness of solutions to the Bellman equation in stochastic dynamic programming

Juan Pablo Rincón-Zapatero

Sophisticated banking contracts and fragility when withdrawal information is public

Xuesong Huang

Relational enforcement

Peter Wagner and Jan Knoepfle

Correlated choice

Christopher Chambers, Yusufcan Masatlioglu and Christopher Turansick

A theory of fair random allocation under priorities

Xiang Han

Data and incentives

Annie Liang and Erik Madsen

The dynamics of instability

César Barilla and Duarte Gonçalves

Contests with sequential entry and incomplete information

Shanglyu Deng, Qiang Fu, Zenan Wu and Yuxuan Zhu

A natural adaptive process for collective decision-making

Florian Brandl and Felix Brandt

Symmetric reduced form voting

Xu Lang and Debasis Mishra

Pair-efficient reallocation of indivisible objects

Özgün Ekici

Existence of monotone equilibria in large double auctions

Paulo Barelli and Srihari Govindan

Optimal sequential contests

Toomas Hinnosaar

2023, volume 18, articles 4

Generalized compensation principle

Karl Schulz, Aleh Tsyvinski and Nicolas Werquin

Efficiency with endogenous population growth. Do children have too many rights?

Mikel Pérez-Nievas

Information design in multi-stage games

Miltiadis Makris and Ludovic Renou

Stability in repeated matching markets

Ce Liu

Robust contracting under double moral hazard

Gabriel Carroll and Lukas Bolte

Surprise and default in general equilibrium

Keisuke Teeple

Conveying value via categories

Paula Onuchic and Debraj Ray

Optimal information disclosure and market outcomes

Hugo Hopenhayn and Maryam Saeedi

Attack and interception in networks

Francis Bloch, Kalyan Chatterjee and Bhaskar Dutta

Pathwise concentration bounds for Bayesian beliefs

Drew Fudenberg, Giacomo Lanzani and Philipp Strack

"Calibeating": beating forecasters at their own game

Dean Foster and Sergiu Hart

Bad apples in symmetric repeated games

Takuo Sugaya and Alexander Wolitzky

2023, volume 18, articles 3

On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion

Andrew Mackenzie and Christian Trudeau

Unrestricted information acquisition

Tommaso Denti

Collective hold-up

Matias Iaryczower and Santiago Oliveros

Strategic investment evaluation

Rishabh Kirpalani and Erik Madsen

Bargaining with evolving private information

Juan Ortner

Optimal allocations with α-MaxMin utilities, Choquet expected utilities, and Prospect Theory

Patrick Beissner and Jan Werner

Incentives in matching markets: counting and comparing manipulating agents

Somouaoga Bonkoungou and Alexander Nesterov

All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof

R. Pablo Arribillaga, Jordi Masso and Alejandro Neme

Optimal disclosure of information to privately informed agents

Ozan Candogan and Philipp Strack

Time-consistent fair social choice

Kaname Miyagishima

The winner-take-all dilemma

Kazuya Kikuchi and Yukio Koriyama

Which misspecifications persist?

Drew Fudenberg and Giacomo Lanzani

2023, volume 18, articles 2

Loss aversion in sequential auctions

Antonio Rosato

Paying with information

Ayça Kaya

Subjective information choice processes

David Dillenberger, R. Vijay Krishna and Philipp Sadowski

Optimal redistribution with a shadow economy

Paweł Doligalski and Luis Rojas

On rank dominance of tie-breaking rules

Maxwell Allman, Itai Ashlagi and Afshin Nikzad

Interview hoarding

Vikram Manjunath and Thayer Morrill

Distance on matchings: an axiomatic approach

Burak Can, Mohsen Pourpouneh and Ton Storcken

Multilevel marketing: pyramid-shaped schemes or exploitative scams?

Yair Antler

The limits of ex post implementation without transfers

Tangren Feng, Axel Niemeyer and Qinggong Wu

Equilibrium existence in games with ties

Wojciech Olszewski and Ron Siegel

Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification

Juan Pereyra and Francisco Silva

Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness

Felix Brandt and Patrick Lederer

2023, volume 18, articles 1

Multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfers

Hitoshi Sadakane

Termination as an incentive device

Borys Grochulski and Yuzhe Zhang

Rationalizable implementation of social choice functions: complete characterization

Siyang Xiong

Optimal information structures in bilateral trade

Christoph Schottmüller

Robust comparative statics for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution

Joel P. Flynn, Lawrence Schmidt and Alexis Akira Toda

Innovation, firm size distribution, and gains from trade

Yi-Fan Chen, Wen-Tai Hsu and Shin-Kun Peng

Pervasive signaling

B. Douglas Bernheim and Aaron L. Bodoh-Creed

Optimal persuasion via bi-pooling

Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Rann Smorodinsky and Takuro Yamashita

On the neutrality of socially responsible investing

Lutz G. Arnold

Additive valuations of streams of payoffs that satisfy the time value of money principle: characterization and robust optimization

Abraham Neyman

Stable matching: an integer programming approach

Chao Huang

On guarantees, vetoes and random dictators

Anna Bogomolnaia, Ron Holzman and Hervé Moulin

∀ or ∃?

Uzi Segal

Slow persuasion

Matteo Escudé and Ludvig Sinander