Theoretical Economics

2006 - Forthcoming

Current editor(s): Simon Board, Todd D. Sarver, Juuso Toikka, Rakesh Vohra, Pierre-Olivier Weill

From Econometric Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Martin J. Osborne ().

Access Statistics for this journal.
Is something missing from the series or not right? See the RePEc data check for the archive and series.

The implications of finite-order reasoning: Adam Brandenburger, Alexander Danieli and Amanda Friedenberg
Subgame-perfect equilibrium in games with almost perfect information: dispensing with public randomization: Paulo Barelli and John Duggan
Renegotiation of long-term contracts as part of an implicit agreement: Rumen Kostadinov
Bilateral trade with a benevolent intermediary: Ran Eilat and Ady Pauzner
Relational communication: Anton Kolotilin and Hongyi Li
Robust sequential search: Karl Schlag and Andriy Zapechelnyuk
Monitoring experts: Yaron Azrieli
Sustainable debt: Gaetano Bloise, Herakles Polemarchakis and Yiannis Vailakis
Local global equivalence in voting models: a characterization and applications: Ujjwal Kumar, Souvik Roy, Arunava Sen, Sonal Yadav and Huaxia Zeng
Robust group strategy-proofness: Steven Kivinen and Norovsambuu Tumennasan
Minimally unstable Pareto improvements over deferred acceptance: Battal Dogan and Lars Ehlers
Payoff implications of incentive contracting: Daniel F. Garrett
Bayesian privacy: Ran Eilat, Kfir Eliaz and Xiaosheng Mu

A dominant strategy, double clock auction with estimation-based tatonnement: Simon Loertscher and Claudio Mezzetti
Cooperative strategic games: Elon Kohlberg and Abraham Neyman
Revenue from matching platforms: Philip Marx and James Schummer
Market power and welfare in asymmetric divisible good auctions: Carolina Manzano and Xavier Vives
Matching with floor constraints: Sumeyra Akin
Mechanism design with financially constrained agents and costly verification: Yunan Li
Strict pure strategy Nash equilibria in large finite-player games: Guilherme Carmona and Konrad Podczeck
Approval voting without ballot restrictions: Federica Ceron and Stéphane Gonzalez
Comparing school choice and college admissions mechanisms by their strategic accessibility: Somouaoga Bonkoungou and Alexander Nesterov
When is a monotone function cyclically monotone?: Alexey I. Kushnir and Lev V. Lokutsievskiy
Simple bets to elicit private signals: Aurelien Baillon and Yan Xu
Bounds on price setting: Narayana Kocherlakota
Bottleneck links, essential intermediaries and competing paths of diffusion in networks: Mihai Manea

The implementation of stabilization policy: Olivier Loisel
Sequential persuasion: Fei Li and Peter Norman
Local agency costs of political centralization: Roger Myerson
Random ambiguity: Jay Lu
Equilibrium in misspecified Markov decision processes: Ignacio Esponda and Demian Pouzo
Evolution, heritable risk and skewness loving: Yuval Heller and Arthur Robson
Costly miscalibration: Yingni Guo and Eran Shmaya
On selecting the right agent: Geoffroy de Clippel, Kfir Eliaz, Daniel Fershtman and Kareen Rozen
Bounded rationality and limited datasets: Geoffroy de Clippel and Kareen Rozen
Communication with forgetful liars: Philippe Jehiel
Trust and betrayals: reputational payoffs and behaviors without commitment: Harry Pei
Delegating learning: Juan F. Escobar and Qiaoxi Zhang
Constrained preference elicitation: Yaron Azrieli, Christopher Chambers and Paul J. Healy

A model of weighted network formation: Leonie Baumann
Agendas in legislative decision-making: Sean Horan
A general analysis of boundedly rational learning in social networks: Manuel Mueller-Frank and Claudia Neri
Convergence in models of misspecified learning: Paul Heidhues, Botond Koszegi and Philipp Strack
Information aggregation in competitive markets: Lucas Siga and Maximilian Mihm
Voting in corporations: Alan Miller
Testable forecasts: Luciano Pomatto
Chain stability in trading networks: Scott Kominers, John William Hatfield, Alexandru Nichifor, Michael Ostrovsky and Alexander Westkamp
Macro-financial volatility under dispersed information: Jianjun Miao, Jieran Wu and Eric Young
A Maximum Likelihood Approach to Combining Forecasts: Gilat Levy and Ronny Razin
Asymptotic synthesis of contingent claims with controlled risk in a sequence of discrete-time markets: David M. Kreps and Walter Schachermayer