Voting in corporations

Alan Miller

Theoretical Economics, 2021, vol. 16, issue 1

Abstract: I introduce a model of shareholder voting. I describe and provide characterizations of three families of shareholder voting rules: ratio rules, difference rules, and share majority rules. The characterizations rely on two key axioms: merger consistency, which requires consistency in voting outcomes following stock-for-stock mergers, and reallocation invariance, which requires the shareholder voting rule to be immune to certain manipulative techniques used by shareholders to hide their ownership. The paper also extends May's theorem.

Keywords: Shareholder voting; axioms; share majority rule; merger consistency; reallocation invariance; one share-one vote; difference rules; ratio rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 G34 K22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-01-15
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/viewFile/20210101/29618/848 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:the:publsh:3668

Access Statistics for this article

Theoretical Economics is currently edited by Simon Board, Todd D. Sarver, Juuso Toikka, Rakesh Vohra, Pierre-Olivier Weill

More articles in Theoretical Economics from Econometric Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Martin J. Osborne ().