Theoretical Economics

2006 - Forthcoming

Current editor(s): Federico Echenique, Mira Frick, Pablo Kurlat, Juuso Toikka, Rakesh Vohra

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2024, volume 19, articles 4

On bargaining norms as solutions to cost-minimization problems: Tymon Tatur
Innovation adoption by forward-looking social learners: Mira Frick and Yuhta Ishii
Robust predictions in dynamic policy games: Juan Passadore and Juan Pablo Xandri Antuna
The property rights theory of production networks: Ivan Balbuzanov and Maciej Kotowski
Auction design with data-driven misspecifications: inefficiency in private value auctions with correlation: Philippe Jehiel and Konrad Mierendorff
Extensive measurement in social choice: Jacob M. Nebel
Boundedly rational demand: Pavel Kocourek, Jakub Steiner and Colin Stewart
An axiomatic characterization of Nash equilibrium: Florian Brandl and Felix Brandt
The persuasion duality: Piotr Dworczak and Anton Kolotilin
Distributions of posterior quantiles via matching: Anton Kolotilin and Alexander Wolitzky

2024, volume 19, articles 3

Buying voters with uncertain instrumental preferences: Charles Louis-Sidois and Leon Andreas Musolff
Existence and uniqueness of solutions to the Bellman equation in stochastic dynamic programming: Juan Pablo Rincón-Zapatero
Bayesian social aggregation with almost-objective uncertainty: Marcus Pivato and Tchouante Ngamo Elise Flore
Correlated choice: Christopher Chambers, Yusufcan Masatlioglu and Christopher Turansick
A theory of fair random allocation under priorities: Xiang Han
Efficient incentives with social preferences: Thomas Daske and Christoph March
Robust performance evaluation of independent agents: Ashwin Kambhampati
Dynamic information preference and communication with diminishing sensitivity over news: Jetlir Duraj and Kevin He
Information transmission in persuasion models with imperfect verification: Francisco Silva
Time-consistent implementation in macroeconomic games: Jean Barthélemy and Eric Mengus
Robust relational contracts with subjective performance evaluation: V. Bhaskar, Wojciech Olszewski and Thomas Wiseman
Stable matching in large markets with occupational choice: Guilherme Carmona and Krittanai Laohakunakorn

2024, volume 19, articles 2

On competition for spatially distributed resources in networks: Giorgio Fabbri, Silvia Faggian and Giuseppe Freni
Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good: Laura Doval and Vasiliki Skreta
Optimal sample sizes and statistical decision rules: Sanket Patil and Yuval Salant
Regret-free truth-telling in school choice with consent: Yiqiu Chen and Markus Möller
Direct implementation with evidence: Soumen Banerjee, Yi-Chun Chen and Yifei Sun
Contracting over persistent information: Wei Zhao, Claudio Mezzetti, Ludovic Renou and Tristan Tomala
Relational enforcement: Peter Achim and Jan Knoepfle
Contests with sequential entry and incomplete information: Shanglyu Deng, Qiang Fu, Zenan Wu and Yuxuan Zhu
A natural adaptive process for collective decision-making: Florian Brandl and Felix Brandt
Symmetric reduced form voting: Xu Lang and Debasis Mishra
Pair-efficient reallocation of indivisible objects: Özgün Ekici
Existence of monotone equilibria in large double auctions: Paulo Barelli and Srihari Govindan

2024, volume 19, articles 1

Persistence in a dynamic moral hazard game: J. Aislinn Bohren
Optimal contests with incomplete information and convex effort costs: Mengxi Zhang
Worst-case equilibria in first-price auctions: Vitali Gretschko and Helene Mass
Wages as signals of worker mobility: Yu Chen, Matthew Doyle and Francisco Gonzalez
A dynamic model of censorship: Yiman Sun
Asset bubbles and product market competition: Francisco Queiros
Exploiting social influence in networks: Vladyslav Nora and Eyal Winter
Digital currency and privacy: Kee-Youn Kang
Asymmetric all-pay auctions with spillovers: Maria Betto and Matthew Thomas
Optimal delegation and information transmission under limited awareness: Sarah Auster and Nicola Pavoni
Sophisticated banking contracts and fragility when withdrawal information is public: Xuesong Huang
Data and incentives: Annie Liang and Erik Madsen
The dynamics of instability: César Barilla and Duarte Gonçalves
Optimal sequential contests: Toomas Hinnosaar

2023, volume 18, articles 4

Generalized compensation principle: Karl Schulz, Aleh Tsyvinski and Nicolas Werquin
Efficiency with endogenous population growth. Do children have too many rights?: Mikel Pérez-Nievas
Information design in multi-stage games: Miltiadis Makris and Ludovic Renou
Stability in repeated matching markets: Ce Liu
Robust contracting under double moral hazard: Gabriel Carroll and Lukas Bolte
Surprise and default in general equilibrium: Keisuke Teeple
Conveying value via categories: Paula Onuchic and Debraj Ray
Optimal information disclosure and market outcomes: Hugo Hopenhayn and Maryam Saeedi
Attack and interception in networks: Francis Bloch, Kalyan Chatterjee and Bhaskar Dutta
Pathwise concentration bounds for Bayesian beliefs: Drew Fudenberg, Giacomo Lanzani and Philipp Strack
"Calibeating": beating forecasters at their own game: Dean Foster and Sergiu Hart
Bad apples in symmetric repeated games: Takuo Sugaya and Alexander Wolitzky

2023, volume 18, articles 3

On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion: Andrew Mackenzie and Christian Trudeau
Unrestricted information acquisition: Tommaso Denti
Collective hold-up: Matias Iaryczower and Santiago Oliveros
Strategic investment evaluation: Rishabh Kirpalani and Erik Madsen
Bargaining with evolving private information: Juan Ortner
Optimal allocations with α-MaxMin utilities, Choquet expected utilities, and Prospect Theory: Patrick Beissner and Jan Werner
Incentives in matching markets: counting and comparing manipulating agents: Somouaoga Bonkoungou and Alexander Nesterov
All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof: R. Pablo Arribillaga, Jordi Masso and Alejandro Neme
Optimal disclosure of information to privately informed agents: Ozan Candogan and Philipp Strack
Time-consistent fair social choice: Kaname Miyagishima
The winner-take-all dilemma: Kazuya Kikuchi and Yukio Koriyama
Which misspecifications persist?: Drew Fudenberg and Giacomo Lanzani

2023, volume 18, articles 2

Loss aversion in sequential auctions: Antonio Rosato
Paying with information: Ayça Kaya
Subjective information choice processes: David Dillenberger, R. Vijay Krishna and Philipp Sadowski
Optimal redistribution with a shadow economy: Paweł Doligalski and Luis Rojas
On rank dominance of tie-breaking rules: Maxwell Allman, Itai Ashlagi and Afshin Nikzad
Interview hoarding: Vikram Manjunath and Thayer Morrill
Distance on matchings: an axiomatic approach: Burak Can, Mohsen Pourpouneh and Ton Storcken
Multilevel marketing: pyramid-shaped schemes or exploitative scams?: Yair Antler
The limits of ex post implementation without transfers: Tangren Feng, Axel Niemeyer and Qinggong Wu
Equilibrium existence in games with ties: Wojciech Olszewski and Ron Siegel
Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification: Juan Pereyra and Francisco Silva
Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness: Felix Brandt and Patrick Lederer

2023, volume 18, articles 1

Multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfers: Hitoshi Sadakane
Termination as an incentive device: Borys Grochulski and Yuzhe Zhang
Rationalizable implementation of social choice functions: complete characterization: Siyang Xiong
Optimal information structures in bilateral trade: Christoph Schottmüller
Robust comparative statics for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution: Joel P. Flynn, Lawrence Schmidt and Alexis Akira Toda
Innovation, firm size distribution, and gains from trade: Yi-Fan Chen, Wen-Tai Hsu and Shin-Kun Peng
Pervasive signaling: B. Douglas Bernheim and Aaron L. Bodoh-Creed
Optimal persuasion via bi-pooling: Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Rann Smorodinsky and Takuro Yamashita
On the neutrality of socially responsible investing: Lutz G. Arnold
Additive valuations of streams of payoffs that satisfy the time value of money principle: characterization and robust optimization: Abraham Neyman
Stable matching: an integer programming approach: Chao Huang
On guarantees, vetoes and random dictators: Anna Bogomolnaia, Ron Holzman and Herve Moulin
∀ or ∃?: Uzi Segal
Slow persuasion: Matteo Escudé and Ludvig Sinander

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