Theoretical Economics

2006 - Forthcoming

Current editor(s): Simon Board, Federico Echenique, Todd D. Sarver, Juuso Toikka, Rakesh Vohra, Pierre-Olivier Weill

From Econometric Society
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Generalized compensation principle: Karl Schulz, Aleh Tsyvinski and Nicolas Werquin
Efficiency with endogenous population growth. Do children have too many rights?: Mikel Pérez-Nievas
Information design in multi-stage games: Miltiadis Makris and Ludovic Renou
Stability in repeated matching markets: Ce Liu
Robust contracting under double moral hazard: Gabriel Carroll and Lukas Bolte
Surprise and default in general equilibrium: Keisuke Teeple
Conveying value via categories: Paula Onuchic and Debraj Ray
Optimal information disclosure and market outcomes: Hugo Hopenhayn and Maryam Saeedi
Attack and interception in networks: Francis Bloch, Kalyan Chatterjee and Bhaskar Dutta
Pathwise concentration bounds for Bayesian beliefs: Drew Fudenberg, Giacomo Lanzani and Philipp Strack
"Calibeating": beating forecasters at their own game: Dean Foster and Sergiu Hart
Bad apples in symmetric repeated games: Takuo Sugaya and Alexander Wolitzky

On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion: Andrew Mackenzie and Christian Trudeau
Unrestricted information acquisition: Tommaso Denti
Collective hold-up: Matias Iaryczower and Santiago Oliveros
Strategic investment evaluation: Rishabh Kirpalani and Erik Madsen
Bargaining with evolving private information: Juan Ortner
Optimal allocations with α-MaxMin utilities, Choquet expected utilities, and Prospect Theory: Patrick Beissner and Jan Werner
Incentives in matching markets: counting and comparing manipulating agents: Somouaoga Bonkoungou and Alexander Nesterov
All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof: R. Pablo Arribillaga, Jordi Masso and Alejandro Neme
Optimal disclosure of information to privately informed agents: Ozan Candogan and Philipp Strack
Time-consistent fair social choice: Kaname Miyagishima
The winner-take-all dilemma: Kazuya Kikuchi and Yukio Koriyama
Which misspecifications persist?: Drew Fudenberg and Giacomo Lanzani

Loss aversion in sequential auctions: Antonio Rosato
Paying with information: Ayça Kaya
Subjective information choice processes: David Dillenberger, R. Vijay Krishna and Philipp Sadowski
Optimal redistribution with a shadow economy: Paweł Doligalski and Luis Rojas
On rank dominance of tie-breaking rules: Maxwell Allman, Itai Ashlagi and Afshin Nikzad
Interview hoarding: Vikram Manjunath and Thayer Morrill
Distance on matchings: an axiomatic approach: Burak Can, Mohsen Pourpouneh and Ton Storcken
Multilevel marketing: pyramid-shaped schemes or exploitative scams?: Yair Antler
The limits of ex post implementation without transfers: Tangren Feng, Axel Niemeyer and Qinggong Wu
Equilibrium existence in games with ties: Wojciech Olszewski and Ron Siegel
Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification: Juan Pereyra and Francisco Silva
Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness: Felix Brandt and Patrick Lederer

Multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfers: Hitoshi Sadakane
Termination as an incentive device: Borys Grochulski and Yuzhe Zhang
Rationalizable implementation of social choice functions: complete characterization: Siyang Xiong
Optimal information structures in bilateral trade: Christoph Schottmüller
Robust comparative statics for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution: Joel P. Flynn, Lawrence Schmidt and Alexis Akira Toda
Innovation, firm size distribution, and gains from trade: Yi-Fan Chen, Wen-Tai Hsu and Shin-Kun Peng
Pervasive signaling: B. Douglas Bernheim and Aaron L. Bodoh-Creed
Optimal persuasion via bi-pooling: Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Rann Smorodinsky and Takuro Yamashita
On the neutrality of socially responsible investing: Lutz G. Arnold
Additive valuations of streams of payoffs that satisfy the time value of money principle: characterization and robust optimization: Abraham Neyman
Stable matching: an integer programming approach: Chao Huang
On guarantees, vetoes and random dictators: Anna Bogomolnaia, Ron Holzman and Herve Moulin
∀ or ∃?: Uzi Segal
Slow persuasion: Matteo Escudé and Ludvig Sinander