Optimal sequential contests
Toomas Hinnosaar
Theoretical Economics, 2024, vol. 19, issue 1
Abstract:
I study sequential contests where the efforts of earlier players may be disclosed to later players by nature or by design. The model has many applications, including rent seeking, R&D, oligopoly, public goods provision, and tragedy of the commons. I show that information about other players' efforts increases the total effort. Thus, the total effort is maximized with full transparency and minimized with no transparency. I also show that in addition to the first-mover advantage, there is an earlier-mover advantage. Finally, I derive the limits for large contests and discuss the limit to perfectly competitive outcomes under different disclosure rules.
Keywords: Contest design; oligopoly; public goods; rent-seeking; R&D (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D72 D74 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-01-26
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)
Downloads: (external link)
http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/viewFile/20240207/38410/1168 (application/pdf)
Related works:
Working Paper: Optimal Sequential Contests (2021) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:the:publsh:5536
Access Statistics for this article
Theoretical Economics is currently edited by Federico Echenique, Mira Frick, Pablo Kurlat, Juuso Toikka, Rakesh Vohra
More articles in Theoretical Economics from Econometric Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Martin J. Osborne ().