All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof
R. Pablo Arribillaga,
Jordi Masso and
Alejandro Neme ()
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Alejandro Neme: Instituto de Matemática Aplicada San Luis
Theoretical Economics, 2023, vol. 18, issue 3
Abstract:
For division problems with single-peaked preferences, we show that all sequential allotment rules, a large subfamily of strategy-proof and efficient rules, are also obviously strategy-proof. Although obvious strategy-proofness is in general more restrictive than strategy-proofness, this is not the case in this setting.
Keywords: Obvious strategy-proofness; sequential sllotment rules; division problems; single-peaked preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-07-20
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)
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Related works:
Working Paper: All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof (2021) 
Working Paper: All Sequential Allotment Rules Are Obviously Strategy-proof (2019) 
Working Paper: All Sequential Allotment Rules Are Obviously Strategy-Proof (2019) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:the:publsh:5111
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