All Sequential Allotment Rules Are Obviously Strategy-proof
R. Pablo Arribillaga (),
Jordi Masso and
Alejandro Neme ()
UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)
For the division problem with single-peaked preferences (Sprumont, 1991) we show that all sequential allotment rules, identified by Barberà, Jackson and Neme (1997) as the class of strategy-proof, efficient and replacement monotonic rules, are also obviously strategy-proof. Although obvious strategy-proofness is in general more restrictive than strategy-proofness, this is not the case in this setting.
Keywords: Obvious Strategy-proofness; Sequential Allotment Rules; Division Problem; Single-peaked Preferences. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-ore
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Working Paper: All Sequential Allotment Rules Are Obviously Strategy-Proof (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aub:autbar:966.19
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