All Sequential Allotment Rules Are Obviously Strategy-Proof

Alejandro Neme (), R. Pablo Arribillaga and Jordi Massó
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Jordi Masso

No 1108, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: For the division problem with single-peaked preferences (Sprumont, 1991) we show that all sequential allotment rules, identified by Barberà , Jackson and Neme (1997) as the class of strategy-proof, efficient and replacement monotonic rules, are also obviously strategy-proof. Although obvious strategy-proofness is in general more restrictive than strategy-proofness, this is not the case in this setting.

Keywords: Single-peaked preferences; Division Problem; obvious strategy-proofness; sequential allotment rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-07
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof (2023)
Working Paper: All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof (2021)
Working Paper: All Sequential Allotment Rules Are Obviously Strategy-proof (2019)
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