All Sequential Allotment Rules Are Obviously Strategy-Proof

R. Pablo Arribillaga (), Jordi Masso and Alejandro Neme ()

No 1108, Working Papers from Barcelona Graduate School of Economics

Abstract: For the division problem with single-peaked preferences (Sprumont, 1991) we show that all sequential allotment rules, identified by Barberà, Jackson and Neme (1997) as the class of strategy-proof, efficient and replacement monotonic rules, are also obviously strategy-proof. Although obvious strategy-proofness is in general more restrictive than strategy-proofness, this is not the case in this setting.

Keywords: obvious strategy-proofness; sequential allotment rules; Division Problem; Single-peaked preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-07
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Related works:
Working Paper: All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof (2021)
Working Paper: All Sequential Allotment Rules Are Obviously Strategy-proof (2019)
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