All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof

R. Pablo Arribillaga, Jordi Masso and Alejandro Neme ()

No 49, Working Papers from Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE)

Abstract: For division problems with single-peaked preferences (Sprumont, 1991) we show that all sequential allotment rules, identified by Barberà, Jackson and Neme (1997) as the class of strategy-proof, eficient and replacement monotonic rules, are also obviously strategy-proof. Although obvious strategy-proofness is in general more restrictive than strategy-proofness, this is not the case in this setting.

Keywords: Obvious; Strategy-proofness; Sequential; Allotment; Rules; Division; Problems; Single-peaked; Preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
Date: 2021-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-ore
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1fOktA96QjDqbODNiFrJOYktb_w48Ekyx/view (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof (2023)
Working Paper: All Sequential Allotment Rules Are Obviously Strategy-proof (2019)
Working Paper: All Sequential Allotment Rules Are Obviously Strategy-Proof (2019)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aoz:wpaper:49

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Laura Inés D Amato ().