Theoretical Economics

2006 - Forthcoming

Current editor(s): Simon Board, Todd D. Sarver, Juuso Toikka, Rakesh Vohra, Pierre-Olivier Weill

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2018, volume 13, articles 3

A general solution method for moral hazard problems

Rongzhu Ke and Christopher Thomas Ryan

A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game

David Martimort, Aggey Semenov and Lars Stole

The optimal degree of monetary-discretion in a New Keynesian model with private information

Yuichiro Waki, Richard Dennis and Ippei Fujiwara

Efficient chip strategies in repeated games

Wojciech Olszewski and Mikhail Safronov

Competition and networks of collaboration

Nikita Roketskiy

Strategy-proof tie-breaking in matching with priorities

Lars Ehlers and Alexander Westkamp

Pareto efficiency and identity

Christopher Phelan and Aldo Rustichini

Transitivity of preferences: when does it matter?

Laurens Cherchye, Thomas Demuynck and Bram De Rock

Efficient cooperation by exchanging favors

Wojciech Olszewski and Mikhail Safronov

On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences

Gabriel Carroll

A tractable model of monetary exchange with ex-post heterogeneity

Guillaume Rocheteau, Pierre-Olivier Weill and Russell Wong

Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent

Arjada Bardhi and Yingni Guo

Rationing rules and stable coalition structures

Oihane Gallo and Elena Inarra

Optimal adaptive testing: informativeness and incentives

Rahul Deb and Colin Stewart

2018, volume 13, articles 2

The transitive core: inference of welfare from nontransitive preference relations

Hiroki Nishimura

Optimal information disclosure: a linear programming approach

Anton Kolotilin

Computational principal agent problems

Pablo Azar and Silvio Micali

Existence and indeterminacy of markovian equilibria in dynamic bargaining games

Vincent Anesi and John Duggan

Efficient dynamic mechanisms in environments with interdependent valuations: the role of contingent transfers

Heng Liu

What kind of central bank competence?

Alex Frankel and Navin Kartik

Span of control, transaction costs and the structure of production chains

Tomoo Kikuchi, Kazuo Nishimura and John Stachurski

Collective household welfare and intra-household inequality

Jean-Paul Chavas, Martina Menon, Elisa Pagani and Federico Perali

Rational expectation of mistakes and a measure of error-proneness

Shaowei Ke

Pareto optimal budgeted combinatorial auctions

Phuong Le

Benchmarking

Christopher Chambers and Alan Miller

Alternating-offer bargaining with the global games information structure

Anton Tsoy

Exchange rates and monetary spillovers

Guillaume Plantin and Hyun Song Shin

Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: a necessary and sufficient condition

Yuichiro Kamada and Fuhito Kojima

Who's afraid of aggregating money metrics?

Kristof Bosmans, Koen Decancq and Erwin Ooghe

2018, volume 13, articles 1

Matching information

Hector Chade and Jan Eeckhout

On asymmetric reserve prices

Maciej Kotowski

The limit of discounted utilitarianism

Adam Jonsson and Mark Voorneveld

Temptation with uncertain normative preference

John Stovall

Robust multiplicity with a grain of naiveté

Aviad Heifetz and Willemien Kets

Who goes first? Strategic delay under information asymmetry

Peter A. Wagner

Dynamic project selection

Arina Nikandrova and Romans Pancs

Robust contracting under common value uncertainty

Sarah Auster

Ranking by rating

Yves Sprumont

Inefficient rushes in auctions

Angel Hernando-Veciana and Fabio Michelucci

Inequality reducing properties of progressive income tax schedules: the case of endogenous income

Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau and Humberto Llavador

High frequency repeated games with costly monitoring

Ehud Lehrer and Eilon Solan

On path independent stochastic choice

David S. Ahn, Federico Echenique and Kota Saito

Collusion constrained equilibrium

Rohan Dutta, David Levine and Salvatore Modica

Payoff equivalence of efficient mechanisms in large matching markets

Yeon-Koo Che and Olivier Tercieux

2017, volume 12, articles 3

Bayesian games with a continuum of states

, and ,

Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in economies with many goods

Takeshi Momi

Attaining efficiency with imperfect public monitoring and one-sided Markov adverse selection

Daniel Barron

Friends and enemies: a model of signed network formation

Timo Hiller

Preventing bank runs

David Andolfatto, Ed Nosal and Bruno Sultanum

Choice overload and asymmetric regret

Gökhan Buturak and Ozgur Evren

Capital-labor substitution, structural change and growth

Francisco Alvarez-Cuadrado, Ngo Long and Markus Poschke

Sovereign debt and incentives to default with uninsurable risks

Gaetano Bloise, Herakles Polemarchakis and Yiannis Vailakis

Equilibria in symmetric games: theory and applications

Andreas Hefti

Characterization and uniqueness of equilibrium in competitive insurance

Vitor Farinha Luz

Preference discovery and experimentation

Kevin Cooke

Double auction with interdependent values: incentives and efficiency

Fuhito Kojima and Takuro Yamashita

Rational expectations and farsighted stability

Bhaskar Dutta and Rajiv Vohra

Active learning with a misspecified prior

Drew Fudenberg, Gleb Romanyuk and Philipp Strack

2017, volume 12, articles 2

Modeling infinitely many agents

Wei He, Xiang Sun and Yeneng Sun

On the equivalence of large individualized and distributionalized games

M. Khan, Kali P. Rath, Haomiao Yu and Yongchao Zhang

Competing with asking prices

Benjamin Lester, Ludo Visschers and Ronald Wolthoff

Social distance and network structures

Ryota Iijima and Yuichiro Kamada

Durable goods monopoly with stochastic costs

Juan Ortner

General revealed preference theory

Christopher Chambers, Federico Echenique and Eran Shmaya

Magical thinking: A representation result

Brendan Daley and Philipp Sadowski

Multinary group identification

Wonki Cho and Biung-Ghi Ju

Choosing on influence

Tugce Cuhadaroglu

Improving matching under hard distributional constraints

Daniel Fragiadakis and Peter Troyan

Bounding equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring

Takuo Sugaya and Alexander Wolitzky

A theory of political gridlock

Juan Ortner

Rationally inattentive preferences and hidden information costs

Henrique de Oliveira, Tommaso Denti, Maximilian Mihm and Kemal Ozbek

One dimensional mechanism design

Herve Moulin

2017, volume 12, articles 1

Directives, expressives, and motivation

Toru Suzuki

Monopolistic nonlinear pricing with consumer entry

Lixin Ye and Chenglin Zhang

Auction design without quasilinear preferences

Brian Baisa

Allais, Ellsberg, and preferences for hedging

Mark Dean and Pietro Ortoleva

Repeated Nash implementation

Claudio Mezzetti and Ludovic Renou

A unifying approach to incentive compatibility in moral hazard problems

Rene Kirkegaard

Job security, stability and production efficiency

Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg, Ron Lavi and Rann Smorodinsky

On the existence of approximate equilibria and sharing rule solutions in discontinuous games

Philippe Bich and Rida Laraki

How do you defend a network?

Marcin Konrad Dziubiński and Sanjeev Goyal

Career concerns with exponential learning

Alessandro Bonatti and Johannes Hörner

Sequential voting and agenda manipulation

Salvador Barberà and Anke Gerber

Dynamic contracting: an irrelevance theorem

Péter Eső and Balázs Szentes

Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources

Marek Pycia and Utku Unver