Bayesian games with a continuum of states

, () and , ()
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,: Department of Economics, Bar Ilan University
,: Department of Economics and Nuffield College, University of Oxford
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Yehuda John Levy

Theoretical Economics, 2017, vol. 12, issue 3

Abstract: We show that every Bayesian game with purely atomic types has a measurable Bayesian equilibrium when the common knowledge relation is smooth. Conversely, for any common knowledge relation that is not smooth, there exists a type space that yields this common knowledge relation and payoffs such that the resulting Bayesian game will not have any Bayesian equilibrium. We show that our smoothness condition also rules out two paradoxes involving Bayesian games with a continuum of types: the impossibility of having a common prior on components when a common prior over the entire state space exists, and the possibility of interim betting/trade even when no such trade can be supported ex ante.

Keywords: Bayesian games; Bayesian equilibrium; common priors; continuum of states (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-09-26
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Bayesian Games With a Continuum of States (2013)
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