Theoretical Economics

2006 - Forthcoming

Current editor(s): Federico Echenique, Mira Frick, Pablo Kurlat, Juuso Toikka, Rakesh Vohra

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Forthcoming

How to segment a search market: information design and directed search

Teddy Mekonnen

A continuum model as a limit of large finite matching markets

Aram Grigoryan

Simple incentives and diverse beliefs

Maxwell Rosenthal

Time consistency, temporal resolution indifference and the separation of time and risk

Felix Kubler, Larry Selden and Xiao Wei

Optimally stubborn: how long to hold and who will fold?

Anna M. Sanktjohanser

Belief in mean reversion and the law of small numbers

Jawwad Noor and Fernando Payro Chew

Marginal stochastic choice

Yaron Azrieli and John N. Rehbeck

Regret in durable-good monopoly

Rumen Kostadinov

Information design in smooth games

Alex Smolin and Takuro Yamashita

Benefits and challenges of ambiguous product information

Matthias Lang and Cédric Wasser

When autarky trumps free and costless trade

John Morgan, Justin Tumlinson and Felix Vardy

Asymptotic value of monitoring structures in stochastic games

Daehyun Kim and Ichiro Obara

Ruth, anthony, and clarence

Jeffrey C. Ely

Combinator dynamics: multi-dimensional evolutionary learning

Srinivas Arigapudi, Omer Edhan, Yuval Heller and Ziv Hellman

Ratings design and barriers to entry

Nikhil Vellodi

Coarse revealed preference

Gaoji Hu, Jiangtao Li, John Quah and Rui Tang

News media as suppliers of narratives (and information)

Kfir Eliaz and Ran Spiegler

Improving robust decisions with data

Xiaoyu Cheng

Keeping your story straight: truthtelling and liespotting

Johannes Hörner, Xiaosheng Mu and Nicolas Vieille

Strategic disclosure in networks

Francesco Squintani

Contract terms monotonicity in matching markets

Cyril Rouault

Physical vs digital currency: a difference that makes a difference

Nicola Amendola, Luis Araujo and Leo Ferraris

Optimal auction design with contingent payments and costly verification

Ian Ball and Teemu Pekkarinen

Semi-stability in roommate problems

P. Jean-Jacques Herings and Yu Zhou

Engagement maximization

Benjamin Hebert and Weijie Zhong

A general theory of inverse welfare functions

Katy Bergstrom and William Dodds

A repeated-choice foundation for stochastic choice

Jay Lu and Kota Saito

Optimal allocation with peer information

Axel Niemeyer and Justus Preusser

Selling information for bilateral trade

Robert Evans and In-Uck Park

Can intergenerational equity be operationalized?: Correction

Michael Greinecker and Michael Andrew Nielsen

Pairwise efficiency and monotonicity imply Pareto efficiency in (probabilistic) object allocation

Tom Demeulemeester and Bettina Klaus

Efficiency of stable matchings with two-sided incomplete information

Yi-Chun Chen and Samuel Ho

Collaboration between and within groups

Matias Iaryczower, Santiago Oliveros and Parth Parihar

The large and likely inefficiency of stable matching mechanisms

Josue Ortega, Gabriel Ziegler, R. Pablo Arribillaga and Geng Zhao

Informed communication equilibrium

Frederic Koessler and Vasiliki Skreta

Efficient investment, search, and sorting in matching markets

Alp Atakan, Michael Richter and Matan Tsur

Repeated games with many players

Takuo Sugaya and Alexander Wolitzky

More reasoning, fewer outcomes: a monotonicity result for reasoning in dynamic games

Andrés Perea

Coalitional manipulability in school choice

Emma Moreno-García and Juan Pablo Torres-Martinez

Strategic experimentation with privately observed payoffs

Jérôme Renault, Eilon Solan and Nicolas Vieille

Differentiability of preferences without derivatives

Michael Richter, Ariel Rubinstein and Áron Tóbiás

Endogenous attention and the spread of false news

Tuval Danenberg and Drew Fudenberg

2026, volume 21, articles 1

Naive calibration

Yair Antler and Benjamin Bachi

Markovian persuasion

Ehud Lehrer and Dimitry Shaiderman

Transparent matching mechanisms

Markus Möller

Chaos and unpredictability with time inconsistent policy makers

Marco Battaglini

Coordination with sequential information acquisition

Xiaoye Liao and Michal Szkup

Mechanism design for acquisition of/stochastic evidence

Elchanan Ben-Porath, Eddie Dekel and Barton Lipman

Strategic exits in stochastic partnerships: the curse of profitability

Boli Xu

Lemonade from lemons: information design and adverse selection

Navin Kartik and Weijie Zhong

Bayesian games with nested information

Royi Jacobovic, Yehuda Levy and Eilon Solan

Choice or competition: does integration benefit everyone?

Yuichiro Kamada and Fuhito Kojima