Strategic disclosure in networks

Francesco Squintani ()
Additional contact information
Francesco Squintani: Department of Economics, University of Warwick

Theoretical Economics, Forthcoming

Abstract: I study strategic transmission of verifiable information through intermediaries, and find that equilibrium full disclosure requires that all players are biased in the same direction relative to the decision maker. By embedding this strategic disclosure game into networks, I explore the intersection of information transmission in networks and strategic communication---two major economic theory research strands. When each networked player may hold information useful for any other's decision, I find that the unique ex-ante optimal network is a line where players are ordered by their bliss points. This is also the unique network immune to coalitional deviations.

Keywords: Strategic communication; networks; disclosure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-11-04
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/viewForthcomingFile/6446/43486/1 Working paper version. Paper will be copyedited and typeset before publication. (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:the:publsh:6446

Access Statistics for this article

Theoretical Economics is currently edited by Federico Echenique, Mira Frick, Pablo Kurlat, Juuso Toikka, Rakesh Vohra

More articles in Theoretical Economics from Econometric Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Editor Theoretical Economics ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).