Benefits and challenges of ambiguous product information

Matthias Lang () and Cédric Wasser
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Matthias Lang: Department of Economics, LMU Munich

Theoretical Economics, Forthcoming

Abstract: We study the welfare effects of ambiguous product information for a buyer with alpha-max-min preferences and a price-setting seller. The buyer privately receives information about her valuation. We show that both the seller and the buyer can benefit when this information is ambiguous, and we characterize all possible combinations of producer and consumer surplus, as evaluated under ambiguity-sensitive preferences. Ambiguity concerning the valuation perceived by the buyer when making the purchase decision can induce the seller to change the price. Before receiving information, ambiguity concerning the purchase decision can make the buyer optimistic about buying only for high valuations, which relaxes the participation constraint.

Keywords: Ambiguity; uncertainty; information design; Bayesian persuasion; bargaining; pricing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D42 D81 D82 D83 L12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-02-27
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Related works:
Working Paper: Benefits and Challenges of Ambiguous Product Information (2026)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:the:publsh:6170

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