Falsification-proof non-market allocation mechanisms

Eduardo Perez-Richet () and Vasiliki Skreta ()
Additional contact information
Eduardo Perez-Richet: Department of Economics, Sciences Po
Vasiliki Skreta: Department of Economics, University of Texas at Austin and Department of Economics, University College London

Theoretical Economics, Forthcoming

Abstract: Relying on manipulable characteristics to target the allocation of resources is fraught with difficulties. Naively optimal rules lead to falsification and allocative inefficiency. Optimizing the rule for allocative efficiency while accounting for falsification typically induces falsification, at a heavy cost to the agents. Moreover, falsification generates negative externalities. We characterize optimal falsification-proof rules under a broad range of falsification technologies. We also provide an honesty condition under which they solve the unconstrained problem of a planner who maximizes a weighted sum of allocative surplus and agents' welfare.

Keywords: Mechanism design; falsification; fraud; manipulation; price of honesty; optimal transport; allocation mechanisms; costly misreporting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-10-23
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/viewForthcomingFile/6687/46660/1 Working paper version. Paper will be copyedited and typeset before publication. (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:the:publsh:6687

Access Statistics for this article

Theoretical Economics is currently edited by Federico Echenique, Mira Frick, Pablo Kurlat, Juuso Toikka, Rakesh Vohra

More articles in Theoretical Economics from Econometric Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Editor Theoretical Economics ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).