Theoretical Economics

2006 - Forthcoming

Current editor(s): Simon Board, Todd D. Sarver, Juuso Toikka, Rakesh Vohra, Pierre-Olivier Weill

From Econometric Society
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Condorcet meets Ellsberg: ,
Innovation vs. imitation and the evolution of productivity distributions: ,, Jan Lorenz and ,
The formation of networks with local spillovers and limited observability: , David
Monotone threshold representations: ,
Negotiation across multiple issues: Gabrielle Gayer and Dotan Persitz
Many-to-many matching and price discrimination: Renato Gomes and Alessandro Pavan
The importance of being honest: Nicolas Klein
A search-theoretic model of the term premium: Athanasios Geromichalos, Lucas Herrenbrueck and Kevin Salyer
Rewards and punishments: informal contracting through social preferences: Sylvain Chassang and Christian Zehnder
Mechanism design with maxmin agents: theory and an application to bilateral trade: Alexander Wolitzky
Transparency and distressed sales under asymmetric information: William Fuchs, Aniko Öry and Andrzej Skrzypacz

Objective rationality and uncertainty averse preferences: ,
List-rationalizable choice: ,
Dynamic markets for lemons: performance, liquidity, and policy intervention: Diego Moreno and John Wooders
The folk theorem with imperfect public information in continuous time: Benjamin Bernard and Christoph Frei
Stability and incentives for college admissions with budget constraints: Azar Abizada
A model of price discrimination under loss aversion and state-contingent reference points: Juan Carlos Carbajal and Jeffrey Ely
Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games: Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Matching with slot-specific priorities: theory: Scott Kominers and Tayfun Sönmez
Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability: R. Pablo Arribillaga and Jordi Masso
A characterization of single-peaked preferences via random social choice functions: Shurojit Chatterji, Arunava Sen and Huaxia Zeng
Savage games: Simon Grant, Idione Meneghel and Rabee Tourky

On the impossibility of core-selecting auctions: , K. and ,
Approximate efficiency in repeated games with side-payments and correlated signals: , H. and ,
Fairness and externalities: Rodrigo Velez
Efficient networks in games with local complementarities: Mohamed Belhaj, Sebastian Bervoets and Frédéric Deroïan
Optimally constraining a bidder using a simple budget: Justin Burkett
Optimal delegated search with adverse selection and moral hazard: Robert Ulbricht
Strategic complementarities and unraveling in matching markets: Federico Echenique and Juan Pereyra
Reputation without commitment in finitely-repeated games: Jonathan Weinstein and Muhamet Yildiz
Large deviations and stochastic stability in the small noise double limit: William Sandholm and Mathias Staudigl
Matching to share risk: Pierre-André Chiappori and Philip Reny
Dynamics in stochastic evolutionary models: David Levine and Salvatore Modica
Fragility of asymptotic agreement under Bayesian learning: ,, , and ,

Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium: , and ,
Characterizing the limit set of PPE payoffs with unequal discounting: ,
Implementation with interdependent valuations: , and ,
Maximal revenue with multiple goods: nonmonotonicity and other observations: , and , J.
Incentive-compatible voting rules with positively correlated beliefs: Mohit Bhargava, , and ,
Information diffusion in networks through social learning: , and ,
One-sided uncertainty and delay in reputational bargaining: Dilip Abreu, David G. Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti
An interaction-based foundation of aggregate investment fluctuations: Makoto Nirei
Gross substitutes and endowed assignment valuations: Michael Ostrovsky and Renato Paes Leme
Monotonic redistribution of performance-based allocations: a case for proportional taxation: André Casajus

Price discrimination through communication: Itai Sher and Rakesh Vohra
Serial dictatorship: the unique optimal allocation rule when information is endogenous: ,
Hidden actions and preferences for timing of resolution of uncertainty: , and ,
Merging with a set of probability measures: a characterization: ,
Communication and influence: Antoni Calvó-Armengol, , and ,
Strategy-proofness and efficiency with non-quasi-linear preferences: a characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule: , and ,
Social activity and network formation: ,
A theory of school choice lotteries: Onur Kesten and Utku Unver
Transparency and price formation: Ayça Kaya and Qingmin Liu
Majority runoff elections: strategic voting and Duverger's hypothesis: Laurent Bouton and Gabriele Gratton

Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection: ,, , H. and ,
Strategic uncertainty and the ex-post Nash property in large games: ,, , P., , and ,
The Foster-Hart measure of riskiness for general gambles: , and ,
A folk theorem for stochastic games with infrequent state changes: , and ,
Communication with tokens in repeated games on networks: Alexander Wolitzky
Is utility transferable? a revealed preference analysis: Laurens Cherchye, Thomas Demuynck and Bram De Rock
Three steps ahead: Yuval Heller
Breakdowns: R Keller and Sven Rady
Unraveling in a repeated moral hazard model with multiple agents: ,