Theoretical Economics

2006 - Forthcoming

Current editor(s): Simon Board, Federico Echenique, Todd D. Sarver, Juuso Toikka, Rakesh Vohra, Pierre-Olivier Weill

From Econometric Society
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Search with multi-worker firms: , and , B.
Refinements of Nash equilibrium in potential games: , and , P.
A ranking method based on handicaps: ,
Escaping the repugnant conclusion: rank-discounted utilitarianism with variable population: , B. and ,
Budget-balance, fairness and minimal manipulability: ,, , and ,
Nestedness in networks: A theoretical model and some applications: , D., Claudio J. Tessone and ,
Free riding and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange: , and , E.
Repeated games with incomplete information and discounting: ,
Dynamic contracts when agent's quality is unknown: , and ,
Second order beliefs models of choice under imprecise risk: non-additive second order beliefs vs. nonlinear second order utility: ,

Robust mechanism design and dominant strategy voting rules: , and Doug Smith
Asynchronicity and coordination in common and opposing interest games: ,, ,, , and ,
Strategy-proofness and Pareto-efficiency in quasi-linear exchange economies: , Prabal, , and ,
An algorithm for two-player repeated games with perfect monitoring: Dilip Abreu and Yuliy Sannikov
Bargaining over an endogenous agenda: , and , J.
A dynamic theory of electoral competition: ,
The transfer problem: A complete characterization: ,
Stochastic stability in monotone economies: , and ,
Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information: , and ,

Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism: Tadashi Hashimoto, Daisuke Hirata, Onur Kesten, Morimitsu Kurino and Utku Unver
On the consistency of data with bargaining theories: , P. and ,
Nonexclusive competition under adverse selection: ,, , and ,
On the relationship between individual and group decisions: ,
Efficiency in repeated games with local interaction and uncertain local monitoring: , and ,
Dynamics of information exchange in endogenous social networks: ,, , and ,
Endogenous agenda formation processes with the one-deviation property: ,
Regular prices and sales: , and ,
Persuasion and dynamic communication: ,

Choice by iterative search: , and ,
Two-stage threshold representations: ,, , and , J.
Endogenous indeterminacy and volatility of asset prices under ambiguity: ,
The good, the bad, and the ugly: An inquiry into the causes and nature of credit cycles: ,
Selection-free predictions in global games with endogenous information and multiple equilibria: , and ,
Fragility of reputation and clustering of risk-taking: , L.
Specialization and partisanship in committee search: , and ,
Editorial: Executive Board
Deterministic equations for stochastic spatial evolutionary games: ,, Markos Katsoulakis and ,
Adverse selection and unraveling in common-value labor markets: , C. and ,
Rationalization: Vadim Cherepanov, Timothy Feddersen and ,

Walrasian equilibrium in large, quasi-linear markets: , M., , Glen and Alexander White
Liquidity hoarding: , and Tanju Yorulmazer
Effective affirmative action in school choice: , Emin, , Bumin and , Ali
A wealth-requirement axiomatization of riskiness: , P. and ,
Achievable outcomes of dynamic contribution games: , A.
Pricing and investments in matching markets: George Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson
Implementation in multidimensional dichotomous domains: , and ,
On the structure of rationalizability for arbitrary spaces of uncertainty: ,
Contingent preference for flexibility: eliciting beliefs from behavior: ,
Rationalizable conjectural equilibrium: A framework for robust predictions: ,
Expressible inspections: , and ,

Scale-invariant uncertainty-averse preferences and source-dependent constant relative risk aversion: ,
A general framework for rational learning in social networks: ,
Hierarchical cheap talk: ,, , M. and ,
Refined best-response correspondence and dynamics: Dieter G. Balkenborg, Josef Hofbauer and Christoph Kuzmics
Ergodic Markov equilibrium with incomplete markets and short sales: , H. B.
Managing pessimistic expectations and fiscal policy: , G.
The order independence of iterated dominance in extensive games: , and ,
Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case: , and ,