Specialization and partisanship in committee search

, () and , ()
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,: Department of Economics, University of Bonn
,: Department of Economics, University of Toronto
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Benny Moldovanu () and Xianwen Shi

Theoretical Economics, 2013, vol. 8, issue 3

Abstract: A committee decides by unanimity whether to accept the current alternative, or to continue costly search. Each alternative is described by a vector of distinct attributes, and each committee member can privately assess the quality of one attribute (her "specialty"). Preferences are heterogeneous and interdependent: each specialist values all attributes, but puts a higher weight on her specialty (partisanship). We study how acceptance standards and members' welfare vary with the amount of conflict within the committee. We also compare decisions made by committees consisting of specialized experts to decisions made by committees of generalists who can each assess all information available. The acceptance standard decreases (increases) in the degree of conflict when information is public (private). In both cases welfare decreases in the level of conflict. Finally, we identify situations where specialized committee decisions yield Pareto improvements over specialized, one-person decisions and over committee decisions made by generalists.

Keywords: Committee search; asymmetric information; interdependent values; specialization; partisanship (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-09-18
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

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