Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case

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,: Department of Economics, University of Mannheim
,: CEREMADE and LEDa, Universite Paris-Dauphine and Institut Universitaire de France
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Francoise Forges and Péter Vida

Theoretical Economics, 2013, vol. 8, issue 1

Abstract: We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be implemented as a strategic form correlated equilibrium of an extended game, in which before choosing actions as in the Bayesian game, the players engage in a possibly infinitely long (but in equilibrium almost surely finite), direct, cheap talk.

Keywords: Bayesian game; cheap talk; communication equilibrium; correlated equilibrium; pre-play communication (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-01-18
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: the two-player case (2013)
Working Paper: Implementation of Communication Equilibria by Correlated Cheap Talk: The Two-Player Case (2011)
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