Implementation of Communication Equilibria by Correlated Cheap Talk: The Two-Player Case

Péter Vida and Francoise Forges

No 3360, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be implemented as a strategic form correlated equilibrium of an extended game, in which before choosing actions as in the Bayesian game, the players engage in a pos-sibly infinitely long (but in equilibrium almost surely finite), direct, cheap talk.

Keywords: Bayesian game; cheap talk; communication equilibrium; correlated equilibrium; pre-play communication (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case (2013)
Working Paper: Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: the two-player case (2013)
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