Theoretical Economics

2006 - Forthcoming

Current editor(s): Simon Board, Todd D. Sarver, Juuso Toikka, Rakesh Vohra, Pierre-Olivier Weill

From Econometric Society
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Optimal insurance with adverse selection: , and ,
Informed principal problems in generalized private values environments: Timofiy Mylovanov and Thomas E. Troger
Balancing supply and demand under bilateral constraints: ,, Rahmi İlkılıç, , and ,
The ex-ante aggregation of opinions under uncertainty: ,
Designing stable mechanisms for economic environments: , J. and ,
Strategy-proof voting for multiple public goods: , and ,
A principal-agent model of sequential testing: , and ,
Mechanism design and communication networks: , and ,

Implementation with evidence: , and ,
Optimal auditing and insurance in a dynamic model of tax compliance: B Ravikumar and ,
Contract, renegotiation, and hold up: Results on the technology of trade and investment: Kristy Buzard and ,
Subjectivity in inductive inference: , and ,
Optimal deadlines for agreements: ,, , and ,
A partial folk theorem for games with private learning: ,

Forward induction reasoning revisited: , and ,
Ashamed to be selfish: , and ,
Choice by lexicographic semiorders: , and ,
An anti-folk theorem for finite past equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring: ,
Reason-based choice: a bargaining rationale for the attraction and compromise effects: , and ,
On the number of critical equilibria separating two equilibria: ,

First-price auctions, Dutch auctions, and buy-it-now-prices with Allais paradox bidders: ,
Von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching: ,, , J. and ,
Dynamic choice under ambiguity: ,
Survival of dominated strategies under evolutionary dynamics: , and , H.
The evolution of decision and experienced utility: , J. and ,
Intertemporal substitution and recursive smooth ambiguity preferences: , and ,

Contributing or free-riding? Voluntary participation in a public good economy: Taiji Furusawa and ,
Agreeing to agree: , and ,
Judicial precedent as a dynamic rationale for axiomatic bargaining theory: , and , E.
Manipulative auction design: ,
Revenue maximization in the dynamic knapsack problem: ,, , and ,
Robust stability in matching markets: ,

A simple status quo that ensures participation (with application to efficient bargaining): , R. and , D.
Search, choice, and revealed preference: , and ,
Transitive regret: , and ,
On the strategic use of attention grabbers: , and ,
Robustness to incomplete information in repeated games: , and ,
Lotteries in student assignment: An equivalence result: , A. and ,

Uniform topologies on types: ,, ,, , and ,
Symmetry of evidence without evidence of symmetry: , G. and ,
Supermodular mechanism design: , A.
A theory of regular Markov perfect equilibria in dynamic stochastic games: genericity, stability, and purification: , and ,
Dynamic monopoly with relational incentives: ,

Efficiency and marginal cost pricing in dynamic competitive markets with friction: , and Sean P. Meyn
Common agency and public good provision under asymmetric information: , and ,
Uphill self-control: , and ,
Competing auctions: finite markets and convergence: ,
Strategic experimentation with Poisson bandits: , and ,

Rationalizable voting: ,
Local stability under evolutionary game dynamics: , H.
Orders of limits for stationary distributions, stochastic dominance, and stochastic stability: , H.
Capitalist investment and political liberalization: , B.
Nash implementation with little communication: , R.