Von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching

, (), , J. () and , ()
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,: CORE, Université Catholique de Louvain
, J.: CORE, Université Catholique de Louvain
,: CORE, Université Catholique de Louvain
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch and Wouter Vergote

Theoretical Economics, 2011, vol. 6, issue 3

Abstract: We adopt the notion of von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) farsightedly stable sets to determine which matchings are possibly stable when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of vNM farsightedly stable sets: a set of matchings is a vNM farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton subset of the core. Thus, contrary to the vNM (myopically) stable sets [Ehlers, J. of Econ. Theory 134 (2007), 537-547], vNM farsightedly stable sets cannot include matchings that are not in the core. Moreover, we show that our main result is robust to many-to-one matching problems with substitutable preferences: a set of matchings is a vNM farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton set and its element is in the strong core.

Keywords: Matching problem; von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets; farsighted stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-09-13
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (62)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching (2011)
Working Paper: Von Neumann-Morgenstern Farsightedly Stable Sets in Two-Sided Matching (2008)
Working Paper: Von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching (2008)
Working Paper: Von Neuman-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching (2008)
Working Paper: Von Neumann-Morgenstern Farsightedly Stable Sets in Two-Sided Matching (2008)
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