Von Neumann-Morgenstern Farsightedly Stable Sets in Two-Sided Matching

Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch and Wouter Vergote

No 6287, Coalition Theory Network Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Abstract: We adopt the notion of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets to predict which matchings are possibly stable when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets: a set of matchings is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton set and its element is a corewise stable matching. Thus, contrary to the von Neumann-Morgenstern (myopically) stable sets, von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets cannot include matchings that are not corewise stable ones. Moreover, we show that our main result is robust to many- to-one matching problems with responsive preferences.

Keywords: Research; Methods/; Statistical; Methods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24
Date: 2008-03
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/6287/files/wp080029.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching (2011)
Working Paper: Von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching (2011)
Working Paper: Von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching (2008)
Working Paper: Von Neuman-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching (2008)
Working Paper: Von Neumann-Morgenstern Farsightedly Stable Sets in Two-Sided Matching (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:feemct:6287

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.6287

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