Von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching

Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch and Wouter Vergote

No 2008016, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: We adopt the notion of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets to predict which matchings are possibly stable when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets: a set of matchings is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton set and its element is a corewise stable matching. Thus, contrary to the von Neumann-Morgenstern (myopically) stable sets, von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets cannot include matchings that are not corewise stable ones. Moreover, we show that our main result is robust to many-to-one matching problems with responsive preferences.

Keywords: matching problem; von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets; farsighted stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-03-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Related works:
Journal Article: Von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching (2011)
Working Paper: Von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching (2011)
Working Paper: Von Neumann-Morgenstern Farsightedly Stable Sets in Two-Sided Matching (2008)
Working Paper: Von Neuman-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching (2008)
Working Paper: Von Neumann-Morgenstern Farsightedly Stable Sets in Two-Sided Matching (2008)
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