Von Neumann-Morgenstern Farsightedly Stable Sets in Two-Sided Matching

Vincent Vannetelbosch, Ana Mauleon and Wouter Vergote

No 2008.29, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: We adopt the notion of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets to predict which matchings are possibly stable when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets: a set of matchings is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton set and its element is a corewise stable matching. Thus, contrary to the von Neumann-Morgenstern (myopically) stable sets, von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets cannot include matchings that are not corewise stable ones. Moreover, we show that our main result is robust to many- to-one matching problems with responsive preferences.

Keywords: Matching Problem; von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets; Farsighted Stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-net
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
https://feem-media.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/w ... oads/NDL2008-029.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching (2011)
Working Paper: Von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching (2011)
Working Paper: Von Neumann-Morgenstern Farsightedly Stable Sets in Two-Sided Matching (2008)
Working Paper: Von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching (2008)
Working Paper: Von Neuman-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2008.29

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Alberto Prina Cerai ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).