Von Neuman-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching

Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch and Wouter Vergote

No 2008013, Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) from Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques

Abstract: We adopt the notion of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets to predict with matchings are possibly stable when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets : a set of matchings is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton set and its element is a corewise stable matching. Thus, contrary to the von Neumann-Morgenstern (myopically) stable sets, von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets cannot include matchings thar are not corewise stable ones. Moreover, we show that our main result is robust to many-to-one matching problems with responsive preferences.

Keywords: matching problem; von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets; farsightedly stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26
Date: 2008-04-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
http://sites.uclouvain.be/econ/DP/IRES/2008-13.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching (2011)
Working Paper: Von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching (2011)
Working Paper: Von Neumann-Morgenstern Farsightedly Stable Sets in Two-Sided Matching (2008)
Working Paper: Von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching (2008)
Working Paper: Von Neumann-Morgenstern Farsightedly Stable Sets in Two-Sided Matching (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ctl:louvec:2008013

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) from Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques Place Montesquieu 3, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium). Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Virginie LEBLANC ().