Implementation with evidence

, () and , ()
Additional contact information
,: Department of Economics, Columbia University
,: Paris School of Economics
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Olivier Tercieux and Navin Kartik

Theoretical Economics, 2012, vol. 7, issue 2

Abstract: We generalize the canonical problem of Nash implementation by allowing agents to voluntarily provide discriminatory signals, i.e. evidence. Evidence can either take the form of hard information or, more generally, have differential but non-prohibitive costs in different states. In such environments, social choice functions that are not Maskin-monotonic can be implemented. We formulate a more general property, evidence-monotonicity, and show that this is a necessary condition for implementation. Evidence-monotonicity is also sufficient for implementation in economic environments. In some settings, such as when agents have small preferences for honesty, any social choice function is evidence-monotonic. Additional characterizations are obtained for hard evidence. We discuss the relationship between the implementation problem where evidence provision is voluntary and a hypothetical problem where evidence can be chosen by the planner as part of an extended outcome space.

Keywords: Mechanism design; costly signaling; verifiable information; Nash implementation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D02 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-05-18
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (85)

Downloads: (external link)
http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/viewFile/20120323/6717/214 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Implementation with Evidence (2012)
Working Paper: Implementation with Evidence (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:the:publsh:723

Access Statistics for this article

Theoretical Economics is currently edited by Simon Board, Todd D. Sarver, Juuso Toikka, Rakesh Vohra, Pierre-Olivier Weill

More articles in Theoretical Economics from Econometric Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Martin J. Osborne ().