Forward induction reasoning revisited

, () and , ()
Additional contact information
,: Department of Economics, Bocconi University
,: Department of Economics, Arizona State University
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Pierpaolo Battigalli () and Amanda Friedenberg

Theoretical Economics, 2012, vol. 7, issue 1

Abstract: Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) formalize the idea of forward induction reasoning as "rationality and common strong belief of rationality" (RCSBR). Here, we study the behavioral implications of RCSBR across all type structures. Formally, we show that RCSBR is characterized by a solution concept we call Extensive Form Best Response Sets (EFBRS's). It turns out that the EFBRS concept is equivalent to a concept already proposed in the literature, namely Directed Rationalizability. (See Battigalli and Siniscalchi 2003.) We conclude by applying the EFBRS concept to games of interest.

Keywords: Epistemic game theory; forward induction; extensive form best response set; directed rationalizability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-01-09
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (32)

Downloads: (external link)
http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/viewFile/20120057/6154/202 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:the:publsh:598

Access Statistics for this article

Theoretical Economics is currently edited by Simon Board, Todd D. Sarver, Juuso Toikka, Rakesh Vohra, Pierre-Olivier Weill

More articles in Theoretical Economics from Econometric Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Martin J. Osborne ().