Mechanism design and communication networks

, () and , ()
Additional contact information
,: Department of Economics, University of Leicester
,: Department of Economics and Decision Sciences, HEC Paris
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Ludovic Renou and Tristan Tomala

Theoretical Economics, 2012, vol. 7, issue 3

Abstract: This paper studies a mechanism design model where the players and the designer are nodes in a communication network. We characterize the communication networks (directed graphs) for which, in any environment (utilities and beliefs), every incentive compatible social choice function is partially implementable. We show that any incentive compatible social choice function is implementable on a given communication network, in all environments with either common independent beliefs and private values or a worst outcome, if and only if the network is strongly connected and weakly 2-connected. A network is strongly connected if for each player, there exists a directed path to the designer. It is weakly 2-connected if each player is either directly connected to the designer or indirectly connected to the designer through two disjoint paths, {\em not necessarily directed}. We couple encryption techniques together with appropriate incentives to secure the transmission of each player's private information to the designer.

Keywords: Mechanism design; incentives; Bayesian equilibrium; communication networks; encryption; secure transmission (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-10-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

Downloads: (external link)
http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/viewFile/20120489/7373/232 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Mechanism design and communication networks (2010)
Working Paper: Mechanism Design and Communication Networks (2010)
Working Paper: Mechanism Design and Communication Networks (2010)
Working Paper: Mechanism Design and Communication Networks (2010)
Working Paper: Mechanism Design and Communication Networks (2010)
Working Paper: Mechanism Design and Communication Networks (2010)
Working Paper: Mechanism Design and Communication Networks (2010)
Working Paper: Mechanism Design and Communication Networks (2010)
Working Paper: Mechanism Design and Communication Networks (2010)
Working Paper: Mechanism Design and Communication Networks (2010)
Working Paper: Mechanism Design and Communication Networks (2010)
Working Paper: Mechanism design and communication networks (2010)
Working Paper: Mechanism Design and Communication Networks (2009)
Working Paper: Mechanism Design and Communication Networks (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:the:publsh:921

Access Statistics for this article

Theoretical Economics is currently edited by Simon Board, Todd D. Sarver, Juuso Toikka, Rakesh Vohra, Pierre-Olivier Weill

More articles in Theoretical Economics from Econometric Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Martin J. Osborne ().