Lotteries in student assignment: An equivalence result

, A. () and , ()
Additional contact information
, A.: Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
,: Department of Industrial Engineering and Operations Research, Columbia University,
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Parag Pathak

Theoretical Economics, 2011, vol. 6, issue 1

Abstract: This paper formally examines two competing methods of conducting a lottery in assigning students to schools, motivated by the design of the centralized high school student assignment system in New York City. The main result of the paper is that a single and multiple lottery mechanism are equivalent for the problem of allocating students to schools in which students have strict preferences and the schools are indifferent. In proving this result, a new approach is introduced, that simplifies and unifies all the known equivalence results in the house allocation literature. Along the way, two new mechanisms---Partitioned Random Priority and Partitioned Random Endowment---are introduced for the house allocation problem. These mechanisms generalize widely studied mechanisms for the house allocation problem and may be appropriate for the many-to-one setting such as the school choice problem.

Keywords: Matching; random assignment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-01-23
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (47)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Lotteries in Student Assignment: An Equivalence Result (2010)
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