Theoretical Economics

2006 - Forthcoming

Current editor(s): Simon Board, Todd D. Sarver, Juuso Toikka, Rakesh Vohra, Pierre-Olivier Weill

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2020, volume 15, articles 4

Private and public liquidity provision in over-the-counter markets: David Arseneau, David E. Rappoport W. and Alexandros P. Vardoulakis
Learning with minimal information in continuous games: Sebastian Bervoets, Mario Bravo and Mathieu Faure
On the falsifiability and learnability of decision theories: Pathikrit Basu and Federico Echenique
An explicit representation for disappointment aversion and other betweenness preferences: Simone Cerreia-Vioglio, David Dillenberger and Pietro Ortoleva
Trade clustering and power laws in financial markets: Makoto Nirei, John Stachurski and Tsutomu Watanabe
Collusion and delegation under information control: Andreas Asseyer
Gradual pairwise comparison and stochastic choice: Rohan Dutta
On the optimal design of biased contests: Qiang Fu and Zenan Wu
Transferable utility and demand functions: Pierre-André Chiappori and Elisabeth Gugl
Countering the winner's curse: optimal auction design in a common value model: Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin Brooks and Stephen Morris
The shape of luck and competition in winner-take-all tournaments: Dmitry Ryvkin and Mikhail Drugov
The wisdom of the crowd in dynamic economies: Pietro Dindo and Filippo Massari

2020, volume 15, articles 3

Twisting the truth: foundations of wishful thinking: Matthew Kovach
Preferences for partial information and ambiguity: Jian Li
Production priorities in dynamic relationships: Jean Guillaume Forand and Jan Zapal
Costly verification in collective decisions: Albin Erlanson and Andreas Kleiner
Optimal incentive contract with endogenous monitoring technology: Anqi Li and Ming Yang
Robust scoring rules: Elias Tsakas
Uncertainty-driven cooperation: Esat Doruk Cetemen, Ilwoo Hwang and Ayça Kaya
School choice with asymmetric information: priority design and the curse of acceptance: Andrew Kloosterman and Peter Troyan
Short-term investments and indices of risk: Yuval Heller and Amnon Schreiber
Optimal dynamic matching: Mariagiovanna Baccara, SangMok Lee and Leeat Yariv
Common learning and cooperation in repeated games: Takuo Sugaya and Yuichi Yamamoto

2020, volume 15, articles 2

Dynamic contracting with limited commitment and the ratchet effect: Dino Gerardi and Lucas Maestri
Mechanism design without quasilinearity: Tomoya Kazumura, Debasis Mishra and Shigehiro Serizawa
Dynamic games with (almost) perfect information: Wei He and Yeneng Sun
The no-upward-crossing condition, comparative statics, and the moral-hazard problem: Hector Chade and Jeroen M. Swinkels
The construction of national identities: Milena Almagro and David Andrés-Cerezo
Equilibrium coalitional behavior: Mert Kimya
Multiplier effect and comparative statics in global games of regime change: Michal Szkup
Network structure and naive sequential learning: Krishna Dasaratha and Kevin He
Delegating performance evaluation: Igor Letina, Shuo Liu and Nick Netzer
Optimal contracts with a risk-taking agent: Daniel Barron, George Georgiadis and Jeroen M. Swinkels
Bundlers' dilemmas in financial markets with sampling investors: Milo Bianchi and Philippe Jehiel

2020, volume 15, articles 1

Uncertain rationality, depth of reasoning and robustness in games with incomplete information: Fabrizio Germano, Jonathan Weinstein and Peio Zuazo-Garin
Information design and sequential screening with ex post participation constraint: Tibor Heumann
Discriminatory price auctions with resale and optimal quantity caps: Brian Baisa and Justin Burkett
Coalition formation and history dependence: Bhaskar Dutta and Hannu Vartiainen
First-price auctions with budget constraints: Maciej Kotowski
Willpower and compromise effect: Yusufcan Masatlioglu, Daisuke Nakajima and Emre Ozdenoren
Learning by matching: Yi-Chun Chen and Gaoji Hu
Locally Bayesian learning in networks: Wei Li and Xu Tan
Agency business cycles: Mikhail Golosov and Guido Menzio
Efficient multi-unit auctions for normal goods: Brian Baisa
Performance-maximizing large contests: Wojciech Olszewski and Ron Siegel

2019, volume 14, articles 4

Optimal dynamic contracting: the first-order approach and beyond: Marco Battaglini and Rohit Lamba
Enforcing social norms: Trust-building and community enforcement: Joyee Deb and Julio Gonzalez-Diaz
School choice under partial fairness: Umut Dur, A. Arda Gitmez and Özgür Yılmaz
Robustness of full revelation in multisender cheap talk: Margaret Meyer, Ines Moreno de Barreda and Julia Nafziger
Common enrollment in school choice: Mehmet Ekmekci and M. Bumin Yenmez
On the clock of the combinatorial clock auction: Maarten Janssen and Bernhard Kasberger
Full substitutability: John William Hatfield, Scott Kominers, Alexandru Nichifor, Michael Ostrovsky and Alexander Westkamp
"Convex preferences": a new definition: Michael Richter and Ariel Rubinstein
Gridlock and inefficient policy instruments: David Austen-Smith, Wioletta Dziuda, Bard Harstad and Antoine Loeper
Justifying optimal play via consistency: Florian Brandl and Felix Brandt
Best experienced payoff dynamics and cooperation in the Centipede game: William Sandholm, Segismundo Izquierdo and Luis Izquierdo

2019, volume 14, articles 3

The loser's curse in the search for advice: Pak Hung Au
Disputes, debt and equity: Alfred Duncan and Charles Nolan
Optimal structure and dissolution of partnerships: Simon Loertscher and Cédric Wasser
Incentives, project choice, and dynamic multitasking: Martin Szydlowski
Competing mechanisms in markets for lemons: Sarah Auster and Piero Gottardi
Stochastic games with hidden states: Yuichi Yamamoto
An N-person war of attrition with the possibility of a non-compromising type: Shinsuke Kambe
Renegotiation proof mechanism design with imperfect type verification: Francisco Silva
Efficient partnership formation in networks: Francis Bloch, Bhaskar Dutta and Mihai Manea

2019, volume 14, articles 2

Strategic experimentation in queues: Martin Cripps and Caroline Thomas
Efficiency and endogenous fertility: Mikel Pérez-Nievas, J. Ignacio Conde-Ruiz and Eduardo Giménez
A foundation for probabilistic beliefs with or without atoms: Andrew Mackenzie
Market selection in large economies: a matter of luck: Filippo Massari
Information and targeted spending: Jon Eguia and Antonio Nicolo'
Selling with evidence: Frederic Koessler and Vasiliki Skreta
Observational learning in large anonymous games: Ignacio Monzon
Communication and cooperation in repeated games: Yu Awaya and Vijay Krishna
Voting on multiple issues: what to put on the ballot?: Alex Gershkov, Benny Moldovanu and Xianwen Shi
Protocol invariance and the timing of decisions in dynamic games: Ulrich Doraszelski and Juan Escobar

2019, volume 14, articles 1

Dynamic objective and subjective rationality: José Faro and Jean-Philippe Lefort
Full surplus extraction and within-period ex post implementation in dynamic environments: Shunya Noda
Boundedly rational backward induction: Shaowei Ke
Decentralized bargaining in matching markets: efficient stationary equilibria and the core: Matthew L. Elliott and Francesco Nava
On the manipulability of efficient exchange rules: Ryan Tierney
Learning dynamics with social comparisons and limited memory: Juan I. Block, Drew Fudenberg and David Levine
On competitive nonlinear pricing: Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti and François Salanié
A theory of personal budgeting: Simone Galperti
Iterated weak dominance and interval-dominance supermodular games: Joel Sobel
Dynamics of strategic information transmission in social networks: Manuel Foerster

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