Optimal dynamic matching

Mariagiovanna Baccara, SangMok Lee () and Leeat Yariv ()
Additional contact information
SangMok Lee: Department of Economics, Washington Univ. in St. Louis
Leeat Yariv: Department of Economics, Princeton University

Theoretical Economics, 2020, vol. 15, issue 3

Abstract: We study a dynamic matching environment where individuals arrive sequentially. There is a tradeoff between waiting for a thicker market, allowing for higher-quality matches, and minimizing agents' waiting costs. The optimal mechanism cumulates a stock of incongruent pairs up to a threshold and matches all others in an assortative fashion instantaneously. In discretionary settings, a similar protocol ensues in equilibrium, but expected queues are inefficiently long. We quantify the welfare gain from centralization, which can be substantial, even for low waiting costs. We also evaluate welfare improvements generated by alternative priority protocols.

Keywords: Dynamic matching; mechanism design; organ donation; market design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-07-03
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

Downloads: (external link)
http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/viewFile/20201221/27661/809 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Optimal Dynamic Matching (2018)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:the:publsh:3740

Access Statistics for this article

Theoretical Economics is currently edited by Simon Board, Todd D. Sarver, Juuso Toikka, Rakesh Vohra, Pierre-Olivier Weill

More articles in Theoretical Economics from Econometric Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Martin J. Osborne ().