Information and targeted spending

Jon Eguia and Antonio Nicolo'

Theoretical Economics, 2019, vol. 14, issue 2

Abstract: We present an electoral theory on the public provision of local public goods to an imperfectly informed electorate. We show that electoral incentives lead to greater spending if the electorate is not well informed. A more informed electorate induces candidates to target funds only to specific constituencies, which can reduce aggregate welfare.

Keywords: Local public goods; information; elections; targeted spending (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D82 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-05-28
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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