Equilibrium coalitional behavior

Mert Kimya ()
Additional contact information
Mert Kimya: School of Economics, University of Sydney

Theoretical Economics, 2020, vol. 15, issue 2

Abstract: I develop two related solution concepts, equilibrium coalitional behavior and credible equilibrium coalitional behavior, which capture foresight and impose the requirement that each coalition in a sequence of coalitional moves chooses optimally among all its available options. The model does not require, but may use, the apparatus of a dynamic process or a protocol that specifies the negotiation procedure underlying coalition formation. Therefore, it forms a bridge between the non-cooperative and the cooperative approaches to foresight.

Keywords: Coalition formation; farsightedness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C71 C72 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-05-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

Downloads: (external link)
http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/viewFile/20200669/27022/781 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:the:publsh:3055

Access Statistics for this article

Theoretical Economics is currently edited by Federico Echenique, Mira Frick, Pablo Kurlat, Juuso Toikka, Rakesh Vohra

More articles in Theoretical Economics from Econometric Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Martin J. Osborne ().