Equilibrium coalitional behavior
Mert Kimya ()
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Mert Kimya: School of Economics, University of Sydney
Theoretical Economics, Forthcoming
I develop two related solution concepts, equilibrium coalitional behavior and credible equilibrium coalitional behavior, which capture foresight and impose the requirement that each coalition in a sequence of coalitional moves chooses optimally among all its available options. The model does not require, but may use, the apparatus of a dynamic process or a protocol that specifies the negotiation procedure underlying coalition formation. Therefore, it forms a bridge between the non-cooperative and the cooperative approaches to foresight.
Keywords: Coalition formation; farsightedness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C71 C72 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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