Iterated weak dominance and interval-dominance supermodular games
Joel Sobel ()
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Joel Sobel: Department of Economics, University of California, San Diego
Theoretical Economics, 2019, vol. 14, issue 1
This paper extends Milgrom and Robert's treatment of supermodular games in two ways. It points out that their main characterization result holds under a weaker assumption. It refines the arguments to provide bounds on the set of strategies that survive iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies. I derive the bounds by iterating the best-response correspondence. I give conditions under which they are independent of the order of deletion of dominated strategies. The results have implications for equilibrium selection and dynamic stability in games.
Keywords: Supermodularity; dominance; equilibrium selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:the:publsh:2904
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