Common learning and cooperation in repeated games

Takuo Sugaya () and Yuichi Yamamoto ()
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Takuo Sugaya: Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Yuichi Yamamoto: Hitotsubashi University, Institute of Economic Research

Theoretical Economics, Forthcoming

Abstract: We study repeated games in which players learn the unknown state of the world by observing a sequence of noisy private signals. We find that for generic signal distributions, the folk theorem obtains using ex-post equilibria. In our equilibria, players commonly learn the state, that is, the state becomes asymptotic common knowledge.

Keywords: Repeated game; private monitoring; incomplete information; ex-post equilibrium; individual learning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-01-24
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