Renegotiation proof mechanism design with imperfect type verification
Francisco Silva
Theoretical Economics, 2019, vol. 14, issue 3
Abstract:
I consider the interaction between an agent and a principal who is unable to commit not to renegotiate. The agent's type only affects the principal's utility. The principal has access to a public signal, correlated with the agent's type, which can be used to (imperfectly) verify the agent's report. I define renegotiation proof mechanisms and characterize the optimal one. The main finding of this paper is that the optimal renegotiation proof mechanism induces pooling at the top, i.e., types above a certain threshold report to be the largest type, while types below the threshold report truthfully.
Keywords: Renegotiation proof; mechanism design; verification (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-08-02
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:the:publsh:3190
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