Theoretical Economics

2006 - Forthcoming

Current editor(s): Simon Board, Federico Echenique, Todd D. Sarver, Juuso Toikka, Rakesh Vohra, Pierre-Olivier Weill

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2009, volume 4, articles 2

Strategy-proofness and single-crossing

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Asymptotic ordinal inefficiency of random serial dictatorship

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Choice deferral and ambiguity aversion

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A resurrection of the Condorcet Jury Theorem

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2009, volume 4, articles 1

The Coase conjecture with incomplete information on the monopolist's commitment

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Monopolistic group design with peer effects

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Coalition formation under power relations

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Robust virtual implementation

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2008, volume 3, articles 4

Risk taking and gender in hierarchies

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Consumer optimism and price discrimination

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Price dispersion and loss leaders

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Contagion through learning

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2008, volume 3, articles 3

Auction design in the presence of collusion

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Subjective expected utility in games

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Credible ratings

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Many inspections are manipulable

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2008, volume 3, articles 2

Monotone methods for equilibrium selection under perfect foresight dynamics

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Non-Bayesian updating: A theoretical framework

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Equilibrium concepts in the large-household model

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Caller Number Five and related timing games

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"Topologies on types": Correction

Executive Board

2008, volume 3, articles 1

Repeated games with incomplete information on one side

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Multi-sender cheap talk with restricted state spaces

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Nonlinear pricing, market coverage, and competition

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Rigidity in bilateral trade with holdup

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2007, volume 2, articles 4

Coarse contingencies and ambiguity

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Noisy talk

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A non-differentiable approach to revenue equivalence

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Complementarities in information acquisition with short-term trades

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2007, volume 2, articles 3

Efficiency in repeated trade with hidden valuations

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Updating preferences with multiple priors

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Secure implementation

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Cold feet

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2007, volume 2, articles 2

Valuation equilibrium

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Incomplete markets with no Hart points

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Can intergenerational equity be operationalized?

, R.

Two-fund separation in dynamic general equilibrium

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2007, volume 2, articles 1

Contracts and uncertainty pp. 1-13

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Interim correlated rationalizability pp. 15-40

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Party platforms in electoral competition with heterogeneous constituencies pp. 41-70

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Delay aversion pp. 71-113

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2006, volume 1, articles 4

A study in the pragmatics of persuasion: a game theoretical approach pp. 395-410

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Optimal auctions with ambiguity pp. 411-438

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Endogenous incomplete markets, enforcement constraints, and intermediation pp. 439-459

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Group formation and voter participation pp. 461-487

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2006, volume 1, articles 3

Topologies on types pp. 275-309

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Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring pp. 311-340

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Regret testing: learning to play Nash equilibrium without knowing you have an opponent pp. 341-367

, P. and , Peyton

Ex post implementation in environments with private goods pp. 369-393

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2006, volume 1, articles 2

Competitive markets with externalities pp. 143-166

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Sufficient conditions for stable equilibria pp. 167-206

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Competition over agents with boundedly rational expectations pp. 207-231

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A theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets pp. 233-273

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2006, volume 1, articles 1

Editorial pp. 1-2

Executive Board

A model of choice from lists pp. 3-17

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Hierarchies of belief and interim rationalizability pp. 19-65

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Financial equilibrium with career concerns pp. 67-93

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Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types pp. 95-118

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Information, evolution and utility pp. 119-142

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