Local stability under evolutionary game dynamics

, H. ()
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, H.: Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: William H. Sandholm

Theoretical Economics, 2010, vol. 5, issue 1

Abstract: We prove that any regular ESS is asymptotically stable under any impartial pairwise comparison dynamic, including the Smith dynamic; under any separable excess payoff dynamic, including the BNN dynamic; and under the best response dynamic. Combined with existing results for imitative dynamics, our analysis validates the use of ESS as a blanket sufficient condition for local stability under evolutionary game dynamics.

Keywords: Evolutionary game dynamics; ESS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-01-26
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

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