Theoretical Economics

2006 - Forthcoming

Current editor(s): Simon Board, Federico Echenique, Todd D. Sarver, Juuso Toikka, Rakesh Vohra, Pierre-Olivier Weill

From Econometric Society
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The implications of pricing on social learning: Itai Arieli, Moran Koren and Rann Smorodinsky
Stable matching under forward-induction reasoning: Luciano Pomatto
Which networks permit stable allocations? A theory of network-based comparisons: Chen Cheng and Yiqing Xing
Sufficientarianism: José Carlos R. Alcantud, Marco Mariotti and Roberto Veneziani
Maskin meets Abreu and Matsushima: Yi-Chun Chen, Takashi Kunimoto, Yifei Sun and Siyang Xiong
When Walras meets Vickrey: David Delacrétaz, Simon Loertscher and Claudio Mezzetti
Collusion enforcement in repeated first-price auctions: Wenzhang Zhang
Regulating a monopolist with uncertain costs without transfers: Manuel Amador and Kyle Bagwell
Dynamic delegation with a persistent state: Yi Chen
On the revealed preference analysis of stable aggregate matchings: Thomas Demuynck and Umutcan Salman
How to sell in a sequential auction market: Ken Hendricks and Thomas Wiseman
Deep and shallow thinking in the long run: Heinrich Harald Nax and Jonathan Newton
Rational bubbles and middlemen: Yu Awaya, Kohei Iwasaki and Makoto Watanabe

Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard: Daniel Gottlieb and Humberto Moreira
Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models: David Martimort and Lars Stole
Experimentation in Organizations: Sofia Moroni
Informative tests in signaling environments: Boaz Zik and Ran Weksler
Surplus sharing in Cournot oligopoly: Daniele Condorelli and Balázs Szentes
Prior-free dynamic allocation under limited liability: Sylvain Chassang and Samuel Kapon
Progressive participation: Dirk Bergemann and Philipp Strack
Quid pro quo: friendly information exchange between rivals: Andreas Blume and In-Uck Park
Mislearning from censored data: The gambler's fallacy and other correlational mistakes in optimal-stopping problems: Kevin He
Persuasion with unknown beliefs: Svetlana Kosterina
Value-based distance between information structures: Fabien Gensbittel, Marcin Pęski and Jérôme Renault
Heterogeneity in decentralized asset markets: Benjamin Lester, Pierre-Olivier Weill and Julien Hugonnier
Monotone contracts: Daniel Bird and Alexander Frug
Equilibrium in a civilized jungle: Ariel Rubinstein and Kemal Yildiz

Dynamic signaling with stochastic stakes: Sebastian Gryglewicz and Aaron Kolb
A common-value auction with state-dependent participation: Stephan Lauermann and Asher Wolinsky
Censorship as optimal persuasion: Anton Kolotilin, Timofiy Mylovanov and Andriy Zapechelnyuk
Games with switching costs and endogenous references: Begum Guney and Michael Richter
Dynamically stable matching: Laura Doval
Indifference, indecisiveness, experimentation and stochastic choice: Efe A. Ok and Gerelt Tserenjigmid
The structure of equilibria in trading networks with frictions: Jan Christoph Schlegel
Incentive-compatible voting rules with positively correlated beliefs: correction: Abhigyan Bose and Souvik Roy
Monologues, dialogues and common priors: Alfredo Di Tillio, Ehud Lehrer and Dov Samet
Long information design: Frederic Koessler, Marie Laclau, Jérôme Renault and Tristan Tomala
Markov distributional equilibrium dynamics in games with complementarities and no aggregate risk: Lukasz Balbus, Pawel Dziewulski, Kevin Reffett and Łukasz Woźny
What were you thinking? Decision theory as coherence test: Itzhak Gilboa and Larry Samuelson
Two-stage majoritarian choice: Sean Horan and Yves Sprumont
(Bad) reputation in relational contracting: Rahul Deb, Matthew Mitchell and Mallesh M. Pai

Malthusian stagnation is efficient: Juan Cordoba and Xiying Liu
Statistical sunspots: William A. Branch, Bruce McGough and Mei Zhu
Information aggregation in Poisson-elections: Mehmet Ekmekci and Stephan Lauermann
Choosing what to pay attention to: Chad Fulton
Transparency and collateral: central versus bilateral clearing: Gaetano Antinolfi, Francesca Carapella and Francesco Carli
Optimal organ allocation policy under blood-type barriers with the donor-priority rule: Jaehong Kim and Mengling Li
Incomplete-information games in large populations with anonymity: Martin Hellwig
Informed intermediaries: Paula Onuchic
Family ties: school assignment with siblings: Umut Dur, Thayer Morrill and William Phan
Equilibrium securitization with diverse beliefs: Andrew Ellis, Michele Piccione and Shengxing Zhang
Rank-optimal assignments in uniform markets: Afshin Nikzad
Equilibrium contracts and boundedly rational expectations: Heiner Schumacher and Heidi Thysen
Bayesian comparative statics: Teddy Mekonnen and René Leal Vizcaíno
Pseudo-Bayesian updating: Chen Zhao