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Theoretical Economics
2006 - Forthcoming
Current editor(s): Simon Board, Todd D. Sarver, Juuso Toikka, Rakesh Vohra, Pierre-Olivier Weill From Econometric Society Bibliographic data for series maintained by Martin J. Osborne (). Access Statistics for this journal.
Is something missing from the series or not right? See the RePEc data check for the archive and series.
2022, volume 17, articles 4
- The implications of pricing on social learning

- Itai Arieli, Moran Koren and Rann Smorodinsky
- Stable matching under forward-induction reasoning

- Luciano Pomatto
- Which networks permit stable allocations? A theory of network-based comparisons

- Chen Cheng and Yiqing Xing
- Sufficientarianism

- José Carlos R. Alcantud, Marco Mariotti and Roberto Veneziani
- Maskin meets Abreu and Matsushima

- Yi-Chun Chen, Takashi Kunimoto, Yifei Sun and Siyang Xiong
- When Walras meets Vickrey

- David Delacrétaz, Simon Loertscher and Claudio Mezzetti
- Collusion enforcement in repeated first-price auctions

- Wenzhang Zhang
- Regulating a monopolist with uncertain costs without transfers

- Manuel Amador and Kyle Bagwell
- Dynamic delegation with a persistent state

- Yi Chen
- On the revealed preference analysis of stable aggregate matchings

- Thomas Demuynck and Umutcan Salman
- How to sell in a sequential auction market

- Ken Hendricks and Thomas Wiseman
- Deep and shallow thinking in the long run

- Heinrich Harald Nax and Jonathan Newton
- Rational bubbles and middlemen

- Yu Awaya, Kohei Iwasaki and Makoto Watanabe
2022, volume 17, articles 3
- Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard

- Daniel Gottlieb and Humberto Moreira
- Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models

- David Martimort and Lars Stole
- Experimentation in Organizations

- Sofia Moroni
- Informative tests in signaling environments

- Boaz Zik and Ran Weksler
- Surplus sharing in Cournot oligopoly

- Daniele Condorelli and Balázs Szentes
- Prior-free dynamic allocation under limited liability

- Sylvain Chassang and Samuel Kapon
- Progressive participation

- Dirk Bergemann and Philipp Strack
- Quid pro quo: friendly information exchange between rivals

- Andreas Blume and In-Uck Park
- Mislearning from censored data: The gambler's fallacy and other correlational mistakes in optimal-stopping problems

- Kevin He
- Persuasion with unknown beliefs

- Svetlana Kosterina
- Value-based distance between information structures

- Fabien Gensbittel, Marcin Pęski and Jérôme Renault
- Heterogeneity in decentralized asset markets

- Benjamin Lester, Pierre-Olivier Weill and Julien Hugonnier
- Monotone contracts

- Daniel Bird and Alexander Frug
- Equilibrium in a civilized jungle

- Ariel Rubinstein and Kemal Yildiz
2022, volume 17, articles 2
- Dynamic signaling with stochastic stakes

- Sebastian Gryglewicz and Aaron Kolb
- A common-value auction with state-dependent participation

- Stephan Lauermann and Asher Wolinsky
- Censorship as optimal persuasion

- Anton Kolotilin, Timofiy Mylovanov and Andriy Zapechelnyuk
- Games with switching costs and endogenous references

- Begum Guney and Michael Richter
- Dynamically stable matching

- Laura Doval
- Indifference, indecisiveness, experimentation and stochastic choice

- Efe A. Ok and Gerelt Tserenjigmid
- The structure of equilibria in trading networks with frictions

- Jan Christoph Schlegel
- Incentive-compatible voting rules with positively correlated beliefs: correction

- Abhigyan Bose and Souvik Roy
- Monologues, dialogues and common priors

- Alfredo Di Tillio, Ehud Lehrer and Dov Samet
- Long information design

- Frederic Koessler, Marie Laclau, Jérôme Renault and Tristan Tomala
- Markov distributional equilibrium dynamics in games with complementarities and no aggregate risk

- Lukasz Balbus, Pawel Dziewulski, Kevin Reffett and Łukasz Woźny
- What were you thinking? Decision theory as coherence test

- Itzhak Gilboa and Larry Samuelson
- Two-stage majoritarian choice

- Sean Horan and Yves Sprumont
- (Bad) reputation in relational contracting

- Rahul Deb, Matthew Mitchell and Mallesh M. Pai
2022, volume 17, articles 1
- Malthusian stagnation is efficient

- Juan Cordoba and Xiying Liu
- Statistical sunspots

- William A. Branch, Bruce McGough and Mei Zhu
- Information aggregation in Poisson-elections

- Mehmet Ekmekci and Stephan Lauermann
- Choosing what to pay attention to

- Chad Fulton
- Transparency and collateral: central versus bilateral clearing

- Gaetano Antinolfi, Francesca Carapella and Francesco Carli
- Optimal organ allocation policy under blood-type barriers with the donor-priority rule

- Jaehong Kim and Mengling Li
- Incomplete-information games in large populations with anonymity

- Martin Hellwig
- Informed intermediaries

- Paula Onuchic
- Family ties: school assignment with siblings

- Umut Dur, Thayer Morrill and William Phan
- Equilibrium securitization with diverse beliefs

- Andrew Ellis, Michele Piccione and Shengxing Zhang
- Rank-optimal assignments in uniform markets

- Afshin Nikzad
- Equilibrium contracts and boundedly rational expectations

- Heiner Schumacher and Heidi Thysen
- Bayesian comparative statics

- Teddy Mekonnen and René Leal Vizcaíno
- Pseudo-Bayesian updating

- Chen Zhao
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On this page- 2022, volume 17
-
Articles 4
Articles 3 Articles 2 Articles 1
Other yearsForthcoming
2025, volume 20
2024, volume 19
2023, volume 18
2021, volume 16
2020, volume 15
2019, volume 14
2018, volume 13
2017, volume 12
2016, volume 11
2015, volume 10
2014, volume 9
2013, volume 8
2012, volume 7
2011, volume 6
2010, volume 5
2009, volume 4
2008, volume 3
2007, volume 2
2006, volume 1
|
On this page- 2022, volume 17
-
Articles 4
Articles 3 Articles 2 Articles 1
Other yearsForthcoming
2025, volume 20
2024, volume 19
2023, volume 18
2021, volume 16
2020, volume 15
2019, volume 14
2018, volume 13
2017, volume 12
2016, volume 11
2015, volume 10
2014, volume 9
2013, volume 8
2012, volume 7
2011, volume 6
2010, volume 5
2009, volume 4
2008, volume 3
2007, volume 2
2006, volume 1
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