Two-stage majoritarian choice

Sean Horan and Yves Sprumont ()
Additional contact information
Yves Sprumont: Department of Economics, Deakin University

Theoretical Economics, 2022, vol. 17, issue 2

Abstract: We propose a class of decisive collective choice rules that rely on a linear ordering to partition the majority relation into two acyclic relations. The first of these relations is used to pare down the set of the feasible alternatives into a shortlist while the second is used to make a final choice from the shortlist. Rules in this class are characterized by four properties: two classical rationality requirements (Sen's expansion consistency and Manzini and Mariotti's weak WARP); and adaptations of two classical collective choice requirements (Arrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives and Saari and Barney's no preference reversal bias). These rules also satisfy some other desirable properties, including an adaptation of May's positive responsiveness.

Keywords: Majority rule; decisiveness; IIA; monotonicity; rational shortlist methods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-05-05
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/viewFile/20220521/33796/970 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Two-stage majoritarian choice (2020)
Working Paper: Two-Stage Majoritarian Choice (2020)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:the:publsh:4712

Access Statistics for this article

Theoretical Economics is currently edited by Simon Board, Todd D. Sarver, Juuso Toikka, Rakesh Vohra, Pierre-Olivier Weill

More articles in Theoretical Economics from Econometric Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Martin J. Osborne ().