Two-Stage Majoritarian Choice

Sean Horan and Yves Sprumont ()

No 13-2020, Cahiers de recherche from Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ

Abstract: We propose a class of decisive collective choice rules that rely on an exogenous linear ordering to partition the majority relation into two acyclic relations. The first relation is used to obtain a shortlist of the feasible alternatives while the second is used to make a final choice. In combination with faithfulness to the underlying majority relation, rules in this class are characterized by two desirable rationality properties: Sen’s expansion consistency and a version of Manzini and Mariotti’s weak WARP. The rules also satisfy natural adaptations of Arrow’s independence of irrelevant alternatives and May’s positive responsiveness.

Keywords: majority rule; decisiveness; IIA; monotonicity; rational shortlist methods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-dcm, nep-des, nep-mic and nep-ore
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Two-stage majoritarian choice (2022)
Working Paper: Two-stage majoritarian choice (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montec:13-2020

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