Monologues, dialogues and common priors

Alfredo Di Tillio (), Ehud Lehrer () and Dov Samet
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Alfredo Di Tillio: Universita' Bocconi
Ehud Lehrer: Tel Aviv University

Theoretical Economics, 2022, vol. 17, issue 2

Abstract: The main purpose of this paper is to provide a simple criterion enabling to conclude that two agents do not share a common prior. The criterion is simple, as it does not require information about the agents' knowledge and beliefs, but rather only the record of a dialogue between the agents. In each stage of the dialogue the agents tell each other the probability they ascribe to a fixed event and update their beliefs about the event. To characterize dialogues consistent with a common prior, we first study monologues, which are sequences of probabilities assigned by a single agent to a given event in an exogenous learning process. A dialogue is consistent with a common prior if and only if each selection sequence from the two monologues comprising the dialogue is itself a monologue.

Keywords: Learning processes; Bayesian dialogue; Bayesian monologue; Ratio variation; Joint fluctuation; Agreement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-05-05
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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